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PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION 
The intellectual climate in which a young Ba'thist 
grew up was complicated. The Arabs under the Ottoman 
Empire revolted against the corruption of the Caliphate in 
the nineteenth century (e.g. the Wahabism). Later there 
were movements of decentralization and separation, 
especially as a reaction against Pan-Turanianism, There 
were also independence movements - under the British and 
French administration. Some sought independence for the 
whole Arab world, and some sought it for their own 
particular area. After the British and the French, there 
were also politicians who were Arab nationalists in varying 
degrees, whether they were in or out of office. To call 
all these and related movements Arab nationalism is to use 
a loose but convenient general term. Moreover, whatever 
the semantic validity of the term, as a slogan, it has had 
a recognisable political effect in the Arab world. 
It would be misleading, of course, to suggest that 
with the extinction of Caliphate complete intellectual 
darkness discended on the Middle East. That could hardly 
be the case, granted the immense heritage of Islam and Arab 
culture. A severe blow had been sustained, since the 
political expression and organising principle of that 
religion and culture had gone. But Islamic thinkers had 
already been wrestling with the problems of the modern 
world and anticipated many of them, in a line from Jamal-
al-Din Afghani through Muhammad Abduh to Rashid Rida. 
There were, however, two drawbacks to this system. First, 
there was no existing example of such a state, so to that 
extent it remained a theory. Secondly, by the 1930s 
it had al ready had a result in the form of a society which can 
not have been any thing but repugnant to such men as 
Michael Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, the founder of 
Ba'thism, namely the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-
Muslimin). Willy-nilly Arab nationalists also had to 
confront the West, which was in their midst through 
military conquest and technical superiority if nothing 
else. In the West the most conspicuous object must 
easily have been the successful, sovereign and secular 
nation state, unknown as yet in the Arab world but the 
norm in Western Europe and North America. Its material and 
intellectual triumphs must have obscured the dangers which 
had already led men to set up the League of Nations. When 
Arab nationalists looked for political ideas or philoso-
phies they found a complex pattern. There was every kind 
of regime; Soviet Russia, Hitlerian Germany and a host of 
monarchies and republics. In the realm of philosophy, to 
over simplify almost grotesquely, they met the heirs of 
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Hegel. Tuese could be found in Marx on the left or Fichte 
and Rosenburg on the right; but Hegelian thought was also 
the prevailing wind of the contemporary intellectual 
climate. There was reaction against it but it was not yet 
widespread on widely heard. 
It is an an inherently vague topic, but the 
intellectual climate of the Damascus and Beirut in the 
1930s and 1940s is also important. The Ba'th was born in 
that cliirate and its founding fathers were emphatically 
part of it. 
It is nevertheless likely that both Aflaq and Bitar 
were more influenced by the period in France and even more 
by their subsequent teaching in Damascus than by their stay 
in Beirut. In Europe they absorbed Hegel and Marx, and in 
Damascus they laid the foundation of the Ba'th as a 
political party. Both were much Francophone and rather cut 
off from, if not hostile to, the Anglo-Saxon culture of 
the American University of Beirut (AUB). Although it is 
hard to obtain details Arab nationalists at this time,were 
primarily concerned with siding their countries of the 
presence of the foreign occupying power: The French in 
Syria and Lebanon, the British everywhere else. Nationalism 
could in this period, be defined almost wholly as a 
rejection of foreign control. But with the gradual winding 
up of French and British military occupation and political 
Vll 
control, a change has occured in the content of Arab 
aspirations. The race for independence has been overtaken 
by the struggle for unity. 
This study seeks to explore as aspect of Arab 
nationalism which entails the transition from Ottomanism 
to Arabism as exemplified in the life and thought of 
Michael Aflaq (1910-1989), who has long been recognized in 
the Arab world as one of the most outspoken exponents of 
secular Pan-Arab nationalism. As educator, Ideologue, 
prolific author* educator, lecturer, he exerted considerable 
influence on educated Arab opinion In the decades following 
the end of the world war II. 
The first chapter, therefore, reveals the genesis 
of Arab nationalism and the factors that contribute to the 
creation of national feeling and explores how the feeling 
of Arab nationalism developed before the world war - I as 
a reaction to the Islamic mode of loyalty in whose name the 
Ottoman had ruled Arab Lands. 
The second chapter treats the ideas of contemporary 
Arab thinker on nationalism and also makes certain compri-
sons between Aflaq and his contemporaries. 
The third chapter focuses on Aflaq's involvement 
in the vicissitudes of the Arab nationalist movement 
during the 1930s and 1940s and traces his political career 
until his death in 1989. It also undertakes his efforts 
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towards the establishment of Ba'th party in Syria. The 
chapter also examines the political circumstances which 
accompanied its development on the regional and Pan-Arab 
levels. 
The fourth chapter concentrates on Aflaq's doctrine 
of Arab nationalism, his intellectual models and his 
general definitions. This chapter also deals with his 
ideas on Islam, unity, freedom and socialism and his 
proposals for the inculcation of historical pride and 
communal solidarity among the Arabs. It further highlights 
the various methods envisaged by Aflaq in view of attaining 
the objective of Arab unity, freedom and socialism. 
The study concludes that Aflaq's intellectual role 
was and has been in the development of an ideology, and not 
with the political manifestation of that ideology. 
Therefore, his treatment of recent political developments 
will be considered only as it illuminates his general 
doctrines of nationalism. His driving motive was always 
the propagation of the sentiments needed to achieve Arab 
unity, and until unity was realized he felt that his 
original arguments on the subject were valid. 
CHAPTER - I 
GENESIS OF ARAB NATIONALISM 
Next to Islam, Arab nationalism has become the most 
important factor to influence Arab society since the turn 
of the present century. To the Arabs, the emergence of 
Arab nationalism is the positive manifestation of the 
rebirth of the Arab nation, and of Arab renaissance. The 
ideological foundation of the modern Arab awakening was 
laid down over a century ago. During its initial phase, 
this resurgence took diverse forms-in inspiration, 
motivation and aspirations. In the Fertile Crescent, for 
instance, it took the form of a cultural renaissance. In 
Egypt it assumed a strong political complexiion, with 
liberation from the Ottoman imperialism and desired for the 
modernization as its dominant characteristics. In Arabia 
it expressed itself in the *-eiigious puritanism of 
Wahabism. The ideology of modern Arab nationalism was 
Khadduri, Majid; Republican Iraq, Oxford University 
Press, London, (1969), p.11. 
initially nurtured by Christian Arab intellectuals who 
started an Arab literacy renaissance in the same manner as 
2 
it was experienced in Europe. 
Precisely, nationalism is a peculiar modern 
phenomenon, it originated from the assumption that nation 
are the primary focus of political allegiance - an 
3 
assumption that has by no seans always widely accepted. 
If in Europe , by nationalism meant the adherence to a 
universal progressive idea looking towards a common future 
of freedom and equality, for Arab nationalist, it is a 
sense of solidarity among those having a language, 
culture, and largely a religion in common. 
In practice, the activist manifestations of Euopean 
nationalism were most characteristic of nations which had 
long been self-assured, sovereign and independent national 
states in their struggles for control over the sources of 
wealth in Europe and throughout the world. It was not to 
establish their autonomous national existence that the 
European powers fought the great wars of 1914-18 and 
2. Sands, William (ed.); The Arab Nation, Middle East-
Institute, Washington, (1961), p. 29. 
3. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica; Vol.8, (1987), 
p. 552. 
4. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica; Vol. 27, (1987), 
p. 470. 
5. Hopwood, Dereb; Syria 1945-1986 Politics and 
Society, Unwin Hyman, London, (1988), p. /9. 
1939-45; it was In order to attain hegemony over the 
other European powers and peripheral continents. 
In the Arab world, on the contrary, the aim of the 
struggle waged against the Imperialist occupying powers -
apart from the reconquest of national sovereignty and the 
eradication of the ex-occupier's power,base - was to win 
the right to decide upon every aspect of national life, as 
a prelude to recovering that identity which lies at the 
heart of the desired renaissance and which has been 
constantly assailed by every means and on every terrain. 
Arab nationalism can be regarded as a force for 
political development in the Arab world. Without doubt 
articulate Arabs (especially those in town and cities) 
share a sentiment a feeling of belonging to an entity they 
call the Arab Nation (al-Umma al-Arablyya) or in more 
restricted terms al-Qawmraiyya al-Arablyya, i.e. Arab 
Q 
nationalism or Arab solidarity. 
Thus the word which is used to express the not ion 
ethnic nationalism in the context of Arab nationalism is 
6. Abdel-Malel, Anour (ed.); Contemporary Arab 
Political ThouRht, Zed Books, London, (1980), 
pp. 8-9. 
7. Ibid., 
8. Vatikiotis, J.P; Conflict in the Middle East, 
Aldlne Altherton, London, (1971), p. 16. 
Qawmiyya an abstract noun formed from qawm , meaning in 
classical Arabic, people followers, group or tribe more 
especially the groups of Kinsfolk mobilized for mutual 
^ 10 support. 
Qawmmiyya presupposes the existence of an Arab 
nation, its solidarity, exclusiveness-and its unity. But 
all these assumptions are founded on an essentially 
religious base; on Islam the faith, on Arabic, the 
language of its Holy Book, on the Shariah, its revealed 
sacred law, and on the history of its glorious conquests 
and empire. It also overlooks the ethnic and sectarian 
diversity that existed under an Islamic universalism. The 
particularism of modern nationalism therefore remained 
opposed to the universalism- and tolerance - of its source 
of inspiration, so that the efforts of the advocates of 
the Qawmmiyya have been mainly directed at reconciling 
the difference and seeking (unsuccessfully so far) a 
9. Qawmiyya , drives from qawm, (people or national 
community), and should not be confused with 
Wataniyya (patriotism) derived from watan, 
Patriotism applies within a State's 
boundaries, where as nationalism applies to a 
community that often transcended the 
confines of a state. 
10. Lewis, Bernard; The Middle East and the West, 
Weidenfeld and " Nicol son, LondorT^ (1963) , 
p. 88. 
symbiosis between Urubah (Arabism, which is at the heart 
of qawmmiyya) and din (religion). The best they have 
been able to achieve has been to translate the solidarity 
of Islamic Umma into the unity of the Arab nation. But in 
order to do that they had first to construct a special 
role for the Arabs in Islam in counterdistinction to that 
12 
of other, non-Arab Muslims. 
11. ARABISM, 'Urubah, is a quasi-mystical term denoting 
the essence of being an Arab . the sense of 
belonging to the Arab nation, the possession 
of Arabic as mother tongue, the fact of 
having been born an Arab in an Arab land, 
being a Muslim. The Ba'th definition omits 
the last category: An Arabis a person whose 
mother tongue is Arabic, who has lived or 
who looks forward to living on Aab soil and 
who believes in being a member of the Arab 
nation. 
In this sense, urubah is neither racial 
nor religious in essence, but fundamentally 
cultural and spiritual. It bestows on the 
sentiment of nationalism a broad cultural 
base which, like the humanistic nationalism 
of mid-nineteenth century Europe, frees it 
from the narrow limits of state or race and 
enables it to espouse universalism and 
humanism as basic components. 
12. "Kawmiyya" in Encyclopaedia of Islam (New Edition), 
Vol. 4, E.J. Brill, (1978), p. 782. 
Briefly, the advocates of Arab nationalism argue 
the existence of an Arab nation (Umma Arabiyya) which, 
though actually divided into separate states, ought to 
be united in a single, organic sovereign political entity. 
What binds the members of the Arab nation together is a 
common faith, Islam, a common language, Arabic, a single 
13 
culture Islamic and a shared history. 
These approximate definition makes two things 
clear: 
(1) In nationalism it is necessary for every individual 
to feel that he is not separate from his 
community, either infact or emotionally, and that 
it is constantly present to his imagination even 
14 
when he is far from his fatherland and alone. 
13. Ibid., 
14. Fatherland, watan, gained its modern meaning from 
and is equivalent to the French Patric. Used 
by an Arab nationalist in Syria the term 
would in most instances refer to the Arab 
fatherland, including all of the Arab world. 
In Arab nationalist parlance the adjective 
Arab or Greater Arab is usually appended to 
Watan-al-watan al-arabi or al-watan al-arabi 
al-kabir- signifying the totality of the 
Arabic-speaking world. Thus the Ba'th Party 
defines the Arab father land as that area 
which is inhabited by the Arab nation,extend-
ing from the Taurus mountains to the 
Pust-i-Kuh mountains, to the Gulf of Basra, 
to the Arabian Sea, the Abyssinians 
Mountains, the Great Desert, the Atlantic 
Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea. 
(2) It is necessary for nationalism to predominante in 
the individual in such a manner that it becomes 
his sole guide, as if it were compulsive instict. 
Then the people will feel that it is homogeneous 
and one and that it has a fundamental natural right 
to freedom and independence. 
Arab nationalism possesses all the foundations and 
constituents that appear in the various definitions of a 
nation. The factors that contribute to the creation of 
national feeling are as follows: 
1. Language: 
Language is a national custom which cements 
amicable relations among all members of the people, so 
that they feel as though they were one family. This 
influence of language in creating a unified homogeneous 
nation may be scientifically explained by the fact that 
language is an instrument for the dissemination of 
thought and feeling. The Arabic language is the 
strongest foundation of Arab nationalism. It has drawn 
1 f\ 
together the Arabs of the various countries. 
15. Al-Ahali, Abdullah; "What is Arab Nationalism", 
Haim , Sylvia G., Arab Nationalism, University 
of California Press, L.A., (1962), p.20. 
16. Ibid., 
The Arabic language is a record of Arab creativity, 
a symbol of their unity, and the expression of their 
intellectual and technical achievements. The Arabic 
language has displayed a tremendous vitality in its 
meticulous structure, its wide extension, and its 
flexibility, which has rendered it a fitting vehicle for 
the transmission of the arts and sciences. Edword 
Atiyah an Islamist and a West Asian Scholar thus states 
that "It ^s a characteristic of the Arab mind to be swayed 
more by words than by ideas, and more by ideas than by 
facts. Transcendental principles, especially when put 
into resonant speech, seem to the Arabs have power 
capable of conquering the greatest practical realities." 
Language for the Arabs is not only a means of 
18 
communication, but an opiate for the people. 
2. History : 
Second to language comes History. This factor is 
of great importance In creating a unified and concentra-
ted feeling, because it is the register of the events, 
good or bad, which have happened to the nation in 
succession. When a group go back to their history, their 
17. Kaipat, Kemal H. (ed.); Political and Social 
Thought in Contemporary Middle East~ Pall 
Mall Press, London, (1968), pp. 44-45. 
18. Tutsch, Hans E. Facets of Arab Nationalism Wayne 
State University Press, Detroit, (1965), p.37 
feelings and ideas go back to certain fixed points, to 
which everybody returns unified in thought and feeling; 
they also preserve the customs of the nation, its aims, 
19 
and its ideals. 
A common history gives rise to common sentiments 
and aspirations, a coomon memory of past glories and 
tribulations, and similar hopes for a renaissance and a 
bright future, A common history does not Involve a mere 
outlook on the past but expands to the future and 
embraces a common destiny. Thus interpreted, a common 
history and a common destiny are both included in the 
20 definition of Arab nationalism. 
3. Religion: 
Religion is a factor in Arab national sentiment. 
It helps to create a kind of unity in the feelings of 
ind ividual. The sporadic outbreaks of sectarian 
fanaticism have been caused either by ignorance or by the 
malice of the enemies of the Arabs. Arab nationalism does 
not disown religion but at the same time does not tolerate 
its exploitation. It believed that genuine and sincere 
Muslims and christians serve not merely their own good but 
the good of society and of humanity. 
19. Op. cit., Haim, Sylvia, G., p. 126. 
20. Op. cit,,Karpat, Kemal, H., p.47. 
21. Ibid., p. 44. 
10 
Islam stands at the beginning of Arab history, or 
what is experienced as history by the Arabs. Islam is not 
a premitive religion, but the end result of a long devel-
opment which led to unity, religious unity, and its out-
growths, linguistic, legal, and historical unity. Islam 
could nev2r have entered the battlefield successfully 
against Byzantine and Western Christendom against 
Persian Zoroastrism, against South Asian Budhism, if it 
had not offered equal or better spiritual values. 
Despite in the course of only a few generations it 
expanded as far as China in the East and Spain and France 
in the West.^^ 
A division of religion and politics, of religion 
and science, or religion and law remains unthinkable as 
long as Islam is a living force, as a long as Islam 
operates as the single, exclusive motivating force of its 
creation. 
Th" Arabs consider Islam as their own special 
religion, revealed to an Arab, Muhammad, in Arabia in the 
Arab language. A similarly close relationship exists 
between religion and science. Philology, the science of 
language, developed in the Arab world out of the necessity 
to interpret the Qur'an. And the holy scripture formed 
22. Op. cit., Tutsch, Hans, E.P. 32 
11 
classical language as no other work could. The language 
serves as medium for the written word in all the Arab 
countries. The dialect of the Prophet became the language 
of the Arab world and the holy word in all Islamic 
regions. Thus, in a historical setting, Arabism owes to 
11) Islam its very existence. 
4. Customs : 
Similarity of customs results, of course, from 
racial, historical, and geographical unity; and there is 
no doubt that the very fact, of your seeing somebody 
behaving in the same way as you do will bring you nearer 
to him. Agreement in customs is the result of agreement 
24 in thought, inclination, feeling, and emotion. 
The Arab intellectuals and political activists 
realise that the cultural and political aspirations of 
'the Arab' would be better served by the separation of 
the Arab provinces from the rest of the Ottoman Empire, 
and some felt by the creation of an Arab State under an 
25 Arab King. As a result a number of Arab societies and 
political parties were formed by enlightened and educated 
young Arabs to defend the Arab cause and protect the Arab 
rights (There were several of these but two came to 
dominate the movement. These two were the young Arab 
23. Ibid., p. 34. 
24. Op cit., Haim, Sylvia, G., P. 127. 
25. Sluglett, Marion Farouk & Peter Sluglett; Iraq 
Since 1958, From Revolution to Dictatorship, 
KPI, London,(1987), pp. 6-7. 
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Society (commonly known as al-Fatat) and Covenant Society 
Of. 
(commonly known as al-Ahd). 
Syria and Lebanon were the hotbeds of the Arab 
nationalism, and they were placed under a rigid Ottoman 
control. When Jamal Pasha, an exponent policy maker of 
the Turkification, was appointed Military Governor in 
those countries during world war I, he embittered Arab 
nationalists and for ever alienated them by hanging their 
principal leaders. This act marked the breaking point in 
Islamic unity, and its striving for independence. If 
Jamal Pasha's oppressive in Syria was the second decisive 
factors in the consolidation of Arab nationalism, the 
third equally decisive factor was the allied 
encouragement and support of the Arabs to the rebel 
against the Turks and gain their freedom and 
27 independence. 
The next turning point in the rise of Arab 
nationalism occurred when the Ottoman Empire decided in 
August 1914 to enter World War I on German side. London 
became interested in a possible Arab alliance against the 
Ottoman Empire, involving these Hashimite Sharifs in 
Mecca. The British Government instructed its Cairo 
representative to contact Husayn, hoping to dissuade him 
26. Dawn, C. Ernest; From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essay 
on the OrigTris of Arab Nationalism, 111 ious 
Press, London,(1973),p.150. 
27. Khadduri, Majid; Political Trends in the Arab 
World, John Hopkins,London,(1970),pp.18-19. 
13 
from endorsing the Jehad or better yet, to pursuade him 
28 
to lead an Arab rebeUion against Ottoman rule. 
The Amir of Mecca and the British High 
Commissioner for Egypt and Sudan exchanged some letters 
in 1915-1916 that have since become famous and highly 
controversial. In the course of what is now known as the 
Husayn -MacMohan correspondence, Britain pledged that if 
Husayn proclaimed an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule it 
would provide military and financial aid during the war 
and would then help to create independet Arab Governments 
in the Arabian Peninsula and in most parts of the Fertile 
r ^29 
Crescent. 
The greater number of Muslim supporters of revolt 
wanted an Arab state under an Arab king, and many of them 
looked to the family of the Sharif of Mecca to provide the 
King; but while some dreamed a single Arab state with an 
Arab Caliph - a revival of the Ottoman Empire with its 
centre of gravity moved from Turks to Arabs - Others still 
kept the ideas of the party of Decentralization, and 
wanted an independent Syria, itself a federation of 
provinces, and in some sort of loose relationship with an 
28. GoldSchmidth, Arthur; Concise History of the 
Middle East, Third Edition, Westview Press, 
Boulder and London, 1979, pp. 193-194. 
29. The Middle East and North Africa, Europa Publi-
cation, London, (1992), p. 67. 
14 
independent Iraq and Hejaz. The link with the Hejaz and 
the Sharif of Mecca sharpened the opposition of the 
Lebanese nationalists, either because they feared a 
revival of Muslim domination or because behind the Sharif 
they saw the policy and ambitions of Great Britain: they 
came out in a favour of a wholly independent Lebanon with 
enlarged frontiers and Beirut as its capital, under the 
protection of France, although they did not all agree on 
the nature and extent of the French control. In the same 
way, the group of 'Syrian nationalists', mainly 
christians, small but important because they had the 
support of the Quai d'Orsay, became more sharply opposed 
to the Arab idea than before: Syrians are not Arabs and, 
30 indeed there is no Arab nation they declared. 
Although the Arabs had by and large supported the 
Allies in the hope that this would mean an end to the 
Turkish rule, their hopes were dashed to ground when It 
became apparent that the victorious imperialist powers 
had their own designs for the area. The British and 
French did not only indulge in the most shameless display 
of "sharing the spoils of war" but also tried to place a 
permanent dagger in the heart of the Arab World - the land 
31 
of Palestine. 
30. Hourani, Albert; Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 
1798-1939, Oxford University Press, London, 
1962, pp. 288-289. 
31. Berindranath, Dewan; Iraq: The Land of Arab Resur-
gence, India,(1979), p. 16. 
15 
British pledge of Arab independence turned to 
be a farce when the British Government started negotia-
ting secretly with the Russian and French governments for 
carving out area among themselves, the Asiastic provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire after victory. The agreement came 
to be known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1960) named after the 
two main negotiators. The Secret Sykes-Picot Agreement 
was signed only a few months after agreement embodied in 
33 Husayn-Macmohan correspondence were concluded. 
Another piece of European manoeuvring seen as 
duplicity by the Arabs was the issuing by Britain of the 
Balfour Declaration in 1917, stating that the British 
government favoured the establishment of a Jewish national 
Home in Palestine. Prime Minister LLoyd George as well 
as Lord Balfour believed that, in view of the prominence 
of the jews in Russian Revolution Movement, it was 
essential to acquire their goodwill by responding favour-
ably to Zionist aspiration. It was also important to 
32. Hasan, Shamir S; "Palestine in Britain Foreign 
Policy: From Balfour Declaration to the 
Establishment of Israel", Indian Journal of 
Politics, Vol. XXIV, 3-4 & Vol. XXV, No.l, 
1990-91, pp. 27-28. 
33. Fisher, Sydney, N; The Middle East, a History 
Rout Ledge & Kegin Paul, London, (1959), 
p. 370. 
34. Lawless, Richard, Middle East in the Twentieth 
Century, Batsford' Academic and Educational 
Ltd., London, (1980), p.30. 
16 
obtain full cooperation and maximum support from Britain's 
35 
new ally, the United States. 
Fighting with the Turks ended by the Armistic of 
30 October 1918 and on 30 January 1919, the Supreme 
Council of the Peace Conference decided that the 
conquered Arab provinces, including Palestine were not to 
be restored to Turkish rule. Further, Britain and France 
arrogated to themselves their mandate over the West Asia 
by the treaty of San-Remo in April 1920 and the League of 
Nations dutyfully subscribed to their will. 
The mandate included in the preamble a text of 
the Balfour Declaration providing for the establishment of 
the Jewish national home with safeguard for the non-
Jewish communities' and the Jews outside palestine. 
A number of Arab secret societies were formed 
before the first world war with the general objective of 
freeing the Arab world from Ottoman domination and of 
setting up some form of Arab state, perhaps with the 
assistance or even under the aegis, of European power. 
In the aftermath of peace settlement in 1918-20 which did 
not produce the independent state that many Arab had 
35. Op. cit., Indian Journal of Politics, p.29. 
36. Ibid., 34, for detail see Antonious George; Arab 
Awakening: The Story of Arab National 
Movement, Coproeom Books, New York, ri965), 
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wished for or fought for, a new form of Arabism or Arab 
37 
nationalism emerge in the region. 
While there are various distinguished names among 
the Arab intellectuals who could be called fore-runners 
of Arab nationalism, the "Sharif" of Hijaz, Hussain 
perhaps stands out as the most important spokesman among 
the Arab leaders representing this new awakening among the 
Arab people. It was his son Faisal of Syria who made the 
famous statement "We were Arabs before Moses, Jesus and 
Mohammad". Faisal was perhaps the first Arab leader to 
have adopted a synthesis of religion and nationalism when 
he said "Religion is for God and Homeland is for all." 
The period following the First World War, which on 
the one hand coincided with socialist revolution in Soviet 
Union, and on the other with the direct involvement of 
Western imperialism in the West Asia, also saw the rise of 
the first nationalist movement in the Arab World. Having 
been betrayed by the French and the British in their 
promises of independence, the Arab masses, especially in 
levant and Palestine rose in a tremendous movement for 
39 
national liberation. 
37. Op. cit., Sluglett, Marion, Farouk, pp. 16-17, 
38. Op.cit., Berindranath, Dewan, p. 19. 
39. Ibid., 20. 
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various movements with varying shades of 
nationalism, Islamic revivalism and Marxism rose during 
that period. The Muslim brotherhood had also started 
taking roots about that time, and was trying to provide 
an answer to the Arab problems through stress on revival 
of Islamic values and strengthening Pan-Islamic bonds 
40 
superseding forces of Arab unity. 
The upsurge of anti-European feeling resulting 
from the failure to achieve independence and national 
unity after world war I necessarily affected the positive 
character of nationalism and inspired it with a negative 
outlook. From the end of the world war I to the early 
thirties, the Arab nationalist demanding independence and 
Arab unity. It is not surprising, therefore, that Arab 
attention was devoted mainly to obtaining political 
independence from European control, and not to far-
reaching discussions on social reform or the adoption of 
particular political systems. As Arab intellectuals had 
not created a clearly defined concept of Arabism before 
the war, it was natural that they confronted in the 
changed circumstances and divided ideologically as they 
were politically. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid, (1970), p. 177 
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The search to overcome these divisions led to a 
variety of proposals, none of which were fully realized, 
but all of which have contributed to the formation of 
Arab nationalism. The externally imposed political 
borders encouraged localism, especially in Syria, where 
the French administration divided the region into four 
separate states (Syria, Greater Lebanon, The Jabal Druze, 
and the State of the Alwites) based on ethnic or 
sectarian concentrations. Representative and advocate of 
this regional trend in Arab nationalism was Antun 
Sa'adah (1904-1949), a Lebanese Christian, who founded the 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party in Beirut in 1930*s. 
Although Sa'adah sought to overcome the divisions within 
Greater Syria, he belongs to the regional current of 
nationalism for his outspoken belief that "Syria was a 
distinct and complete entity which should not be part of a 
larger Arab nation". He saw in Syria's identification 
with Arab nationalism a surrender of its unique qualities 
and, in becoming part of a larger country that was less 
advanced or progressive than Syria, the acceptance of an 
/ 0 
inferior status. 
Further complicating was the disinterested stance 
adopted by the majority of the Egyptian intellectuals. 
42. Cleveland, William L. "Scources of Arab 
Nationalism": An Overview, in Curtis, 
Michael (ed.). Religion and Politics in the 
Middle East, Westview Press/Boulder, 
Colorado. 1981, p.61. 
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In the period between the world wars, Egypt was engaged in 
its own struggle for independence from Great Britain, and 
the foundations of Egyptian nationhood did not emphasize 
primarily Arab symbols. At the same time they did not 
identify themselves with Arabism, the idea of unity was 
43 projected by Syrian or Iraqi politicians. 
The third major expression of Arab political and 
cultural identity was formulated by those who rejected 
regionalism and Islamic sentiments in favour of secular 
Pan-Arab nationalism. Their writings have kept alive the 
idea of a unified Arab nation bound by ties of Arab 
culture. This doctrine received its clearest exposition 
from the ideologue and educator Sati'al-Husri (1880-1968). 
Husri Advocated a secular type of Arab national-
ism, completely divorced from religion. His argument was 
based partly on the nature of Islam, which stressed 
universal rather than national values; partly on the 
historical experiences of the Arabs among whom nationalism 
emerged as a reaction against Islamic unity; and partly 
because of the existence of the Christian Arabs in Arab 
Lands, whose bonds of unity with other Arabs were language 
and History.'^ ^ 
43. Ibid. 
44. Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid, (1970), p. 204. 
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In a memorandum respecting "Pan-Arabism" to the 
then British Foreign Secretary Anothony Eden, dated May 
27, 1936, Gilbert mackereth, HM Consul in Damascus 
asserted, "There is no doubt of the existence of an Arab 
movement, but there is considerable doubt regarding its 
potentialities. " 
Nationalism is not essentially, however, a self-
protective effort of an old society and way of life to 
perpetuate itself. It is the earnest striving of the 
society to reform itself in order to secure a legitimate 
place of equality and dignity in a rapidly changing 
world. Colonialism inevitably destroy the self confidence 
of those upon whom it has been thrust. The nationalists 
are those who have achieved renewed confidence in 
themselves and have mastered the ideas and instruments, 
the outlooks and institutions of those who had asserted a 
temporary predominance over them. 
In essence Arab unity has the following 
objectives: 
1. To see every inch of Arab soil free from any 
foreign domination. 
45. Op. Cit., Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 781. 
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2. To work for the political and military solidarity 
of the Arab states in order to secure a common 
front for the defense of Arab interests. 
3. To enhance the cooperation on the cultural and 
economic levels and thus pave the way for a 
stronger and more coherent Arab Society. 
Indeed, Arab nationalism is a positive and a 
creative response to the shattering impact of the modern 
west upon the Arab World. It has created a revolutionary 
dynamism in the Arab society which has come to insist on 
taking control of its destiny into its own hands. In 
fact, one of the striking features of 'Arab nationalism is 
its tremendous vigour, welling up from the hearts of the 
people. It is neither founded on national grievances, nor 
is it essentially destructive in character. It is not a 
"sickness" as some western observers are prone to declare, 
rather it is a positive and honourable sentiment 
46 
reflecting a people's search for self-realization. 
It is hazardous to speculate on the future. But 
one can safely say that the earlier nationalists, 
irrespective of their failures, contributed signifcantly 
47 to the riss and development of Arab nationalism. 
46. Op.cit.,Sands William;'ihe Arab Nation, p. 31. 
47. Abu-Lughod Ibrahim: "Arab Nationalism: Socio-
political Considerations", Davisuri, Andrew 
Mack, Nira Yuval Davis ed., Israel and the 
Palestinians, Ithaca Press, London,(1975), 
CHAPTER - II 
NATIONAL AWAKENING IN ARAB POLITICAL THOUGHT 
Virtually no independent school of Arab political 
thought existed until nationalism emerged as an ideologi-
cal force towards the end of the nineteenth century. In 
the past, practically every Muslim intellectual in the 
West Asia, regardless of his ethnic origin, had tried to 
interpret changing social and political conditions 
according to Islamic notions of government and authority. 
It was mainly the Christian Arabs of Lebanon and Syria -
notably the maronites and, to a lesser extent, the members 
of other Eastern Churches - who had developed an interest 
in their local history and language as early as the 
eighteenth century. Muslim Arabs, however, did not 
experience a truly nationalist awakening until the end of 
the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
century. 
A large proportion of the educated Arab elite, 
"Particularly in Syria and Iraq, received 
their education not so much from French and 
American schools and colleges, the 
importance of which has perhaps been over 
stressed, as from the educational insti-
tutions set up in the successive phases of 
the Ottoman reform. Consequently, many 
developments can only be fully appreciated 
in this large context". 
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The alms of Arab nationalism were never formulated 
In a set of principles at the time Arabs grew aware of 
themselves as a group separate from others in the Ottoman 
Empire. Before World War - I, while the Arab idea of 
nationalism was mingled with the idea of Islamic unity, 
Arab nationalism scarcely aimed beyond the rehabilitation 
of Arab race in multinational empire. The aim of Arab 
nationalism was merely to restore the Arabs to their lost 
role in Islam to which they felt entitled. Even the early 
Arab Christian thinkers, who advocated complete separation 
from the Ottoman union, were ready to compromise their 
extreme nationalist views to Islamic unity so as to 
2 
maintain solidarity with their Muslim compatriots. 
Muslim liberal thinkers who advocated the idea of 
nationalism did neither demand that Arab lands be detached 
from the Ottoman Empire nor indeed that religion be 
separated from the state. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi 
3 (1849-1903), the most radical thinker who attacked 
Ottoman rule, called for the restoration of the Caliphate 
from Turkish to Arab hands, but not for a break in Ottoman 
Khadduri, Majid., Political Trends in the Arab 
World, John Hopkins Press, London, (1970), 
p. 19. 
Abd al-Rahman al-Kawaklbi belonged to a family of 
Aleppo, of Kurdish origin. He had an old-
fashioned Arabic and Turkish Education in 
his native city, and then worked there as 
official and journalist untill he Fell foul 
of the Turkish authorities and found it best 
to move to Cairo in 1898. 
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unity.'^  He failed, however, to define his frequent 
references to the Arab nation in clear nationalist terms, 
and his idea of nationalism represented but a transition 
from the ecumenical to the national stage. 
Al-kawakibi was in truth a revolutionary in spirit 
and inclination and that he often used to say; "if I had 
an army, I would have over thrown the government of 
Abdul Hamid in twenty-four hours". This estimate is 
confirmed by The Characteristics of Tyranny. In this book 
al-kawakibi attacks political and religious tyranny and 
its nefarious effects on science, morality and progress. 
"True Islam", he argues, "is incompatible with tyranny, 
and it must lead to the just state in which individual 
lives happily, at one with his nation, completely free, 
yet completely owned by it." It is only a just political 
order, he says, that makes possible science, morality and 
progress. In this book Taba'i al-Istibdad (the character-
istics of tyranny) which was and still remains very 
popular, el-kawakibi gave currency to a secular view of 
politics which holds that the only just government is 
government according to the will of the people, that any 
4. Al-Kawakibi's argument that the Turks usurped the 
Caliphate from the Arabs was based on the 
doctrine that one of the qualification of 
the Caliph must be his descent from the Arab 
tribe of Quraysh, according to authorita-
tive legal texts. 
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other government is tyrannical and can be removed by the 
governed.^ He held the tyrannical nature of the Ottoman 
state responsible for the stagnation of Islam and 
declared the Ottoman Empire unfit to protect the faith. 
Thus, the regeneration of Islam could only be undertaken 
by the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula since only they 
were free of racial, religious and sectarian bias. 
The ideas that he expressed in his other book, 
Umma al-qura, were even more revolutionary. This book 
attempts to explain the stagnation of Islam and to provide 
a remedy for it. The Muslim, he says, "are now a dead 
people with no corporate being or feelings. Their 
stagnation is the result of the tyranny, of the decline of 
the Islamic culture, and of the absence of racial and 
linguistic bonds among Muslims, and partly for this reason 
the Ottoman Empire is not fit to preserve Islam. The 
Muslim Kingdom is made up of different countries 
professing different religions and divided into numerous 
sects, and their ministers are drawn from different 
nationalit-i.es. Thus the Ottoman Empire cannot effect the 
regeneration of Islam. Regeneration should be the work of 
the Arabs who would supply a Caliph, residing in Mecca, 
and acting as the spiritual head of an Islamic union. 
5. Haim, Sylvia G. (ed.)., Arab Nationalism: An 
Anthology, Los Angeles and London, Univer-
sity of California Press, (1962), p. 26. 
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Al-Kawakibi also provides a list of twenty-six different 
reasons tc prove the superiority of the Arabs and why the 
Caliphate should devolve upon them. 
There were no half measures in his attitude, he 
saw the Arabs as better Muslims than the Turks. As such 
they deserved to have their position of primacy in Islam 
acknowledged and recognized by other Muslims. Here lies 
the most glaring contradiction that has plagued Arab 
nationalism as an ideology of the Arabs. For the question 
that has remained unanswered is! 'which Arabs?' It was 
obvious, since the call was made on religious grounds, 
that Kawakibi, being a Sunni Muslim and a Syrian, meant 
that it was the primacy of the Sunni Muslims which out to 
be acknowledged. This fact in the evolution of Arab 
nationalism has been completely overlooked. Moreover, 
subsequent works on Arab nationalism especially, strangely 
as it may seem, by Christian ideologues of Arab 
nationalism have come to subscribe to this view. 
Al-Kawakibi, then, may be considered as the first 
intellectual precursor of modern secular Pan-Arabism. He 
6. Ibid., p. 27. 
7. Kelidar, Abbas, "The Rise of Arab Nationalism", 
Davis Uri, Andrew Mack, Nirayuval-Davis 
(ed.); Israel and the Palestinians, Ithaca 
Press, London, (1975), pp. 86-87. 
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was the first to declare himself, without ambiguity, as 
the champion of the Arabs against the Turks. 
The intellectual milieu of Istanbul in which many 
an Arab nationalist grew up was dominated by young 
Ottoman secular thought and most of the leaders who 
opposed Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's Pan-Islamic tried to keep 
the nationalist movement immune from Islamic influences. 
Most Arab nationalists were not prepared to accept the 
young Ottoman view of Islam, because Islam was regarded as 
a product of the Arabs cultural heritage from which they 
did not want to depart; indeed, most of them, including 
Christian thinkers, took pride in Islam because it laid 
special emphasis on the Arabic character of the Qur'an 
Q 
and on the Arabic language. 
It is this significant cultural element which 
prompted Arab thinkers to regard Islam as a component of 
Arab nationalism. To the Arabs, Islam came into being in 
Arabia, the cradle of the Arab race, and Muhammad was an 
Arab Prophet and a national hero. The Qur'an was not only 
revealed in Arabic language but all believers, Arabs as 
well as non-Arabs, had it as their obligation to recite it 
in Arabic. The Arabs were the first believers of Islam 
and they struggled to spread it and establish the Islamic 
Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid, p. 179, 
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Empire. It was the Arabic language and Arab cultural 
heritage which superseded the racial bond and made 
possible the Arabization of people who adopted the Arab 
tongue and identified themselves as Arabs, especially the 
9 
people of the Fertile Crescent. 
It was the Arabic language and culture which 
inspired Arab thinkers, Muslims and Christian alike, to 
develop Arab national consciousness and call for an Arab 
identity separate from Ottoman identity in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a product of 
the Arab heritage, Islam has been looked upon as a 
spiritual force and a set of moral values necessary for 
life. But if Islam is seen as a component of nationalism, 
it no longer remains the exclusive loyalty in the 
traditional sense. 
Perhaps the representative thinker whose primary 
loyalty was to Islam but who accepted nationalism as a 
basis for the Islamic state was the reformer Rashid Rida 
(1865 - 1935). Rashid Rida left his native land Syria and 
came to Cairo in 1897 where he published the review 
Al-Manar (The Beacon) until his death in 1935. •'•'• 
9. Ibid., p. 180. 
10. Ibid., p. 181. 
11. Hourani, Albert., Arabic Thought in the Liberal 
Age, 1798 - 19?^ Oxford University Press, 
London, (1962), p.227. 
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If on the one hand Mohammad (1849-1905) Abduh makes 
no concessions to nationalism or patriotism as a factor in 
achieving unity, Rashid Rida represents yet a second 
trend. While opposing Ottoman rule, he rejected any 
tendency towards establishing separate Arab states based 
on non-Islamic solidarity in the Islamic World. But the 
Arabs, for him, had a special place within the Islamic 
nations. "The Other Muslims", he held, "were pupils of 
the Arabs". This opposition to Ottoman rule was counter-
balanced in Egypt by a strong pro-Ottoman movement with 
12 
comparatively less interest in religion. 
Infused with the Arab nationalism Rashid Rida 
often showed more concern about Arab problems than those 
of other Islamic countries. In the true traditional Arab 
view of Islam, Rida spoke of the founder of Islam as an 
Arab Prophet, the Qura'an as revealed scripture in the 
Arab tongue, and the Arabs as the carriers of the message 
13 
of Islam beyond the frontiers of Arabia. Giving reply 
to a question set by an Indonesian correspondent 
regarding 'what is the attitude of Islam toward $ 
nationalism', Rida maintained that "As for the modern 
12. Bezirgan, Najm, A. "Islam and Arab Nationalism", 
Curtis, Michael (ed.). Religion and Politics 
in the Middle East, West View Press, Boulder, 
Colorado (1981), p. 44. 
13. Op. cit., Khadduri,Majid > P* 181. 
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idea of nationalism, it is nothing but union of the 
inhabitants of a homeland who may be different in 
religion, who cooperate in the defence of their common 
homeland and in preserving its independence or in winning 
it back, when it is lost, and in increasing its prospe-
rity. Such an idea does not manifest itself in Indonesia 
as it does in Egypt. Islam considers that it is the 
duty of Muslims to defend those of other religions who 
came under their rule and to treat them on a basis of 
equality, according to the just rulings of the Sharia'. 
As far the kind of nationalism that should adorn the 
Muslim youth, it is that he should set a good example to 
the inhabitants of his homeland irrespective of their 
religion and sects, and that he should cooperate with 
them in every legitimate action to further the 
independence of the homeland and to raise it up in 
learning, virtue, strength, and wealth, according to the 
rules of Islamic law which lays down that rights and 
duties devolve on the nearest relatives and then on 
those nearest to them. Further Muslim youth must not 
forget, while serving his homeland and his people, that 
Islam has honoured him and exalted his position by making 
him a brother to hundreds of millions of Muslims in the 
world; he is a member of a body bigger than his people, 
his own personal homeland is only a part of his religious 
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Perhaps the most forceful expression of this blend 
of Islam and nationalism by Muslim thinkers is to be found 
in the writings of Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz. Abdul Rahman 
al Bazzaz, educated in law at the University of London in 
the late thirties, imbued with humanistic comception of 
classical western liberalism returned to his home in 
Baghdad in 1939. In his distinguished career first as a 
teacher and scholar and later as a diplomat and statesman, 
al-Bazzaz remained faithful to his fundamental conception 
of Arab nationalism in terms of a humanistic perspective 
of individual emancipation within the framework of 
evolutionary social progress. 
Much of al-Bazzaz's early writings are concerned 
with defining the relation between Islam and Arab 
nationalism. In Min Roh al-Islam (From the spirit of 
Islam) published in Baghdad in 1959, he advanced the 
thesis that "there is no real opposition between Islam and 
Arab nationalism: the Arab nation is the core of the 
Islamic community; most of Muslims are also Arabs; the 
Qur'an is in Arabic and embodies the traditional morality 
of the Arabs the Prophet was an Arab; Islam is the 
medium through which the Arabs made their contribution to 
history".^^ 
17. Ismail, Tariq, Y., The Arab Left, Syracuse Univer-
sity Press, America, (1976), p.6. 
18. Op. cit., Hourani Albert; p. 309. 
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homeland, and he must therefore seek to make the progress 
of the part a means toward the progress of the whole." 
The distinction between what he wrote and the 
action he was prepared to take is reinforced by his 
political record during his early years in Egypt. He came 
to Egypt as a radical, discontented with the situation of 
the Ottoman Empire and anxious for reform. And thers 
significantly enough, he joined the party of the young 
Turks. It was after the young Turk Revolution, and indeed 
after the Balkan Wars, that Rashid Rida joined others in 
forming the decentralization party, when the Young Turks 
showed themselves bent on a centralizing policy 
15 detrimental both to the Arabs and to the Empire. 
According to Rida, "the Europeans are active and 
successful because they have abandoned their other 
worldly religion and replaced it by the principle of 
nationality, but Muslims can find such a principle of 
unity and loyalty in their religion itself. For the 
second distinguishing sign of Islam is that it has 
created a single community; not simply a Church, a body of 
men linked by faith and worship yet separated by their 
natural characteristics, but a community in every sense. 
14. Rida, Rashid, "Islam and the National Idea" Haim, 
Sylvia G. (ed.) Arab Nationalism: An Antho-
logy, Lon Angeles and London, 1962, p"^  76. 
15. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
16. Op. cit., Hourani Albert; P- 229. 
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This conception of the essential unity of Arab 
nationalism and Islam runs through al-Bazzaz's early 
formulation of the four basis of Arab nationalism: 
language, history, literature and customs and character. 
Arab nationalism for al-Bazzaz, like Zuraiq and other 
19 liberals, is inextricably fused with Islam. 
According to Bazzaz contradiction between Islam and 
Arab nationalism which is still present in the mind of 
many people is, in the first place, due to misunder-
standing, misrepresentation and misinterpretation, 
20 involving both Isl«m and Arab nationalism. This he 
maintained, sprang from a western conception of Islam and 
of nationalism, and that so many Arab had accepted it 
showed the intellectual domination of the West over 
them. 
The misunderstanding of Islam, maintained by Bazzaz 
is due to the wrong significance attributed to the word 
'religion'. He says, "We are influenced here as a result 
of the intellectual imperialism under which a group of us 
still labour by the western concepts which restricts 
religion within narrow limits not extending beyond 
19. Op. cit., Ismail, Tariq, Y., p. 7. 
20. Bazzaz, Abd al-Rahmanal, "Islam and Arab 
Nationalism" Haim, Sylvia G. (ed.) Arab 
Nationalism: An Anthology, Los Angeles and 
London, (1962), p. 173. 
21. Op. cit., Hourani Albert; p. 308. 
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worship, ritual, and the spiritual beliefs, which govern a 
man in his behaviour, in relation to his God and to his 
brotherman, in his capacity of an individual independent 
of society. Islam does not admit this narrow view of 
religion, but opposes it and the purpose it serves to the 
utmost. Many people still believe that Islam is similar 
to Christianity or Budhism, and consists in devotional 
beliefs and exercises, ethical rules and no more. But, 
in fact, Islam, in its precise sense, is a social order, 
a philosophy of life, a system of economic principles, a 
rule of government, in addition to its being a religious 
22 
creed in the narrow Western sense." 
He further argues that there Is absolutely no 
contradiction between Arablsm and Islam. The two converge 
on many points, yet Islam can not be included as a 
"necessary" element in the formation of Arab nationalism. 
What is interesting in his view is that; 
"If we equate religion and national-
ism, we would exclude one-tenth of 
the Egyptian population, and 
one-fifth of Syria and about one-half 
of the population of Lebanon from 
Arab nationalism. We would also 
exclude a sizeable proportion of the 
Iraqis, Palestinians, Jordanians, and 
Sudanese, as well as a great number 
of Arabs who have Immigrated to 
America, Africa and other continents. 
22. Op. clt.. Halm, Sylvia G., p. 173. 
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But, on the other hand when we lose 
these millions (of Arabs), the 
theory (that Islam is an essential 
element) would have us consider.... 
every Muslim in Asia.... brothers in 
the national sense, which means that 
the sons of the same nationality will 
have the same political destiny and 
one ultimate national interest, and 
requires the establishment of a 
social and political solidarity and 
association among them... can the 
advocate of an Islamic nationalism 
imagine the consequences of this type 
of thinking and ... the responsi-
bilities and obligations, which are 
beyond our power and resources?" 
Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz revived the old arguments 
when he asserted that nationalism and Islam went hand in 
hand in many respects. In the course of so doing he was 
to expose the nature of Arab nationalism as a divisive 
and elitist movement and so to provide an affirmation of 
the nationalist belief in the necessity for the pre-
eminent position of the Sunni Community in Islam. To him 
nationalism had to take on the activist nature of Islam 
since nationalism was an assertion by the Arabs of the 
resumption of the mission of Mohammad. Thus the Prophet 
becomes the founder of the Arab nation, and Islam is the 
product of the Arab national genius. This kind of 
analysis leaves out the non-Muslim Arab, the Christian 
and the Jew, the non-Arab Muslim, the Kurd and Berber, and 
23. Op. cit., Curtis, Michael, p.48, 
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the heterodox Muslim, shi'ite, Druze, Alawi and Ismaili. 
But Bazzaz claims to provide a solution for this dilemma 
too. "These groups become true Arabs when they recognize 
Muhammad as the hero of Arab nationalism and venerate 
Islam as the religion that entitled the Arab nation to 
assert its place in the world. This seems to be an open 
invitation not only to the non-Sunni Muslims but to the 
Christians, and the Jews to acknowledge that the Muslim 
Sunni Arab has the right ordained in orthodoxy to enjoy a 
position of primacy and presumably-rule all non-Sunni 
.^ . 24 
communities. 
Strangely as it may seem a number of Christian 
ideologues of Arab nationalism have accepted Bazzaz's 
thesis and condoned his pretensions. Indeed Qustantin 
Zuraiq whom Bazzaz cites as a model Christian 
nationalist thinker, in contrast to the early Christian 
advocates of nationalism (who advocated the separation of 
religion and state), was also emphasized the compati-
bility between Islam and nationalism and called on his 
fellow Christians to accord Islam a special veneration. 
Like Zuraiq and other liberal nationalists, 
al-Bazzaz's primary concern was with individual freedom 
24. Op. cit., Davis Uri, Andrew Mack, Nirayural-
Davis, pp. 90-91. 
25. Ibid. 
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and dignity. The role of the State, then, is to secure 
individual freedom while protecting social justice as he 
wrote in 'This is Our Nationalism', "a happy mean between 
the absolute individualism that gave rise to capitalism 
and Marxist - inspired communism .... Our Arab 
nationalism strives for social justice in every sense of 
the term, while at the same time it seeks to reinforce 
the bases of social solidarity between the individuals of 
the entire community in order to prevent exploitation and 
class domination." 
In the early twenties the assertion of secular 
ideas alarmed religious circles, and nationalist leaders, 
who needed the support of religious groups in the 
struggle for independence, sought to conciliate religious 
leaders by paying lip service to Islam. Moreover, the 
growing interest in Arabic and Islamic studies both in 
native and foreign educational institutions, created an 
awareness of the overlapping elements of culture and 
religion and of the importance of Islam to Arab 
27 
nationalism. 
At the outset this trend disturbed Christian Arab 
thinkers who feared that the association of religion with 
nationalism might arouse religious fanaticism and restore 
26. Op. cit., Ismail,Tariq,Y ; p. 8, 
27. Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid, p. 183. 
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the social exclusiveness of Ottoman days. Meanwhile, 
secular thinkers regarded the trend as a step backward, 
construed to please religious and conservative quarters 
rather than to serve the cause of modernism and progress. 
Very soon, however, it was realized that the religious and 
ethical values of Islam were so ingrained in Arab society 
that they could not be ignored as a basic ingredient of 
nationalism. It was at this stage that Christian 
thinkers, like Qustantin Zuraiq and Edmond Rabbath, 
began to explain the inescapable association of religion 
28 
and nationalism. In his first volume of essay on 
National Consciousness (al-Wa'y al-qawmi), which appeared 
in late 1939, Zura iq has discussed these ideas at 
length. 
In dealing with the fundamental issue of the 
relationship between Islam and Arab nationalism, Zuraiq 
argued, "that a basic problem of Arab society is that we 
have no convictions; having no convictions, we cannot 
subordinate our individual desires and passions to an 
organisation rooted in a principle; therefore, we can not 
act successfully as a group. Nationalism is the 
conviction we need; that is to say, a sense of collective 
28. Ibid., p. 184, 
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responsibility, a feeling of belonging to a nation, but 
one of a special sort, a nation which draws its 
inspiration from a religion. For the Arabs this religion 
29 
can only be Islam." 
However, he draws a sharp distinction between "the 
religious spirit" (al-ruh al-diniyya) and "sectarian 
fanaticism" (al-asabiyy al-lai'fiyya). The assumptions 
underlying this distinction appear to be two-fold: first 
that all religio s contain the same core of truth, 
accessible alike to all men; and secondly, that the moral 
principles of religion are those which are necessary to 
build a stable and prosperous society. In this sense, 
then, "sectarian fanaticism" consists of the dogmatic 
assumption by adherents of a particular religion that 
their particular religion has a special claim to moral 
validity, while "religious spirit" means participation of 
the individual in the moral truth inherent in all great 
30 
religions. 
Nationalism, therefore, spiritual movement as it 
is, must converged toward religion and draw from it 
strength, life, sublimity and excellence. Such is Arab 
nationalism in its true character: it does not in any way 
29. Op. cit., Hourani, Albert; p. 309. 
30. Op, cit., Ismail, Tariq Y; p.4. 
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oppose or negate any religion, but it accepts all 
religions in order to draw from their sources the cups of 
purity and liberation, of strength and immortality. If 
nationalism does contradict anything, it is not the 
religious spirit but the destructive fanaticism, which 
makes the communal tie stronger than the national tie and 
refuses to dissolve itself in the all-consuming 
crucible of the nation; for it is the fanaticism which 
often exploits innocent religious feeling for its own 
Partisan ambitions and inclinations. Thus fanaticism is 
the chronic disease of the land, and its authors are the 
enemies of Arab nationalism and destroyers of its unity. 
True religion, however, which aims to develop the forces 
of the spirit, springs from the same sources as 
nationalism, and they both go in the same direction, 
towards the same end. It is therefore incumbent on the 
Arab nationalists to go back to the sources of their 
religion in order to draw from them spiritual excellence 
and strength of soul, and to seek inspiration, among 
other things, from the historys of all their Prophets so 
as to enrich their souls with the strength and the purity 
31 
which overflow from these religions. 
31. Zuraiq, Qustantin, "Arab Nationalism and Religion" 
Haim, Sylvia G., (ed.) Arab nationalism:An 
Anthology, Log Angeles and London (1962), 
pp.l6a-69. 
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In later writings, Zuraiq emphasized that "Islam is 
the Arab past, not the future. The state must preserve 
the mental and spiritual values of Arab civilization, for 
progress depends not only on the acquisition and 
efficient use of material technology, but also on the 
stead fastness of moral character, depth of belief, 
patience in adversity, and earnest pursuit of the greater 
social goals. However the state must be absolutely 
separated from religious institutions, for nationalism in 
32 inconsistent with literal theocracy." 
Qustantin Zuraiq pointed out as early as 1938 that 
no Arab national renaissance was possible without a 
national philosophy that would establish goals and 
methods of achieving those goals. According to him "A 
national revival could succeed only by. 
Considering carefully the means and 
the ends involved, by defining the 
meaning of nationhood and national-
ism, establishing the special traits 
and characteristics of the Arab 
nation and making manifest its 
special place among the nations and 
the role it has fulfilled in the 
past ... and (will) fulfil in the 
future... through the creation of a 
comprehensive, clear and systematic 
national philosophy." 33 
32. Op. cit.,Ismail, Tariq, Y; p. 4. 
33. Karpat, Kemal, H.(ed.), Political and Social 
Thought in Contemporary Middle East, Pall 
mall Press, London, (1968), p.11. 
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Arab nationalism certainly meant something 
different to Christian than to Muslims. Some West Asian 
Christians see nationalism as a secular movement. Arab 
nationalism does not mean Arab unity or Pan-Arabism to 
most Christians. They accept the Islamic background as 
part of a civilization in which they have participated 
since immemorial times, speaking the same language, 
living as separate millets in the same framework of 
laws.^^ 
Scholar Wilfred Cartwell Smith on the other hand 
cautions that, "some writers have been too hasty in 
assuming or concluding that a Western-type nationalism In 
this positive sense could be or has been adopted fairly 
easily or effectively into the Islamic world... it was the 
Islamic impetus that carried the Arabs from their obscure 
home into historic greatness, in conquest and creativity. 
Islam gave the Arabs earthly greatness; and vice versa, it 
was the Arabs who gave Islam its earthly success... The 
synthesis is close: an identification, at times 
unconscious, of Islam and Arabism. On the one hand, an 
Arab need not be pious or spiritually concerned in order 
to be pround of Islam's, historic achievements. Indeed, 
34. Tutsch, Hans E., Facets of Arab Nationalism, Wayne 
State University Press, Detroit, (1965), p.67 
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he need not even be a Muslim; Christian Arabs have taken 
a share in that pride." In fact Christians have played an 
enormous role in the initial stages of the birth of Arab 
nationalism and some Christians, like Michael Aflaq, are 
still recognized as the leader of nationalist 
movement. 
For example the fundamental ideological principles 
of the Aflaq's Ba'th Party are more advanced and more 
elaborate than those of the other nationalist parties in 
the Arab countries, but it is curious that while the 
party's constitution stresses the historical continuity 
of the Arab nation, it makes no mention of Islam. This 
does not mean that the party's intellectual leaders are 
less concerned with the question of religion than were the 
forerunners of the Arab nationalist movements. In fact, 
there is a great deal of similarity between the concept 
of Michael Aflaq on this topic and earlier views of 
al-Husri and others. For Aflaq, "Islam is the beginning 
of Arabism". He sees a spiritual affinity between the 
two; a view which is also held by an independent 
Christian nationalist, Qustantin Zuraiq. But Aflaq is an 
ideologue par excellence, who is mainly concerned 
with establishing historical foundations for Arab 
nationalism in order to further the interest of his party. 
35. Ibid., p. 50. 
36. Op. cit., Curtis, Michael, p. 50. 
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Yet the failure of the Arab nationalist movement 
has been mainly due to the absence of any genuine and 
serious attempt to examine validity of the nationalist 
case and its relationship to Islam. This failure has been 
compounded by the parallel failure to articulate a concept 
of common national citizenship not dependent on social, 
ethnic or religious status. Only when this is done will 
it be possible to create a polity which will enjoy both 
national consensus and genuine national cohesion. Only 
then can the Arabs achieve nationhood. Equally, if not 
more important,is the question of legitimacy. Political 
control may be primarily instrumental but political 
legitimacy is primarily evaluative. The diverse and 
divergent groups which exist in many contemporary Arab 
countries will accord legitimacy to a political system or 
reject it according to the degree of congruence between 
the values of that system and their own values. And thus 
as long as the Arab nationalist conceives Arab » 
nationalism primarily in terms of his religious affilia-
tion the claim to nationhood will continue to be 
37 questioned and challenged. 
37. Op. cit., Davis Uri, Andrew Mack, Nirayural-Davis, 
p. 92. 
CHAPTER - III 
MICHAEL AFLAQ AND THE INTEGRATION 
IN THE ARAB WORLD 
The idea of nationalism had begun among Christian 
intellectuals before it did among Muslims. The Christians 
had been more strongly exposed to Western cultural 
influence, and they had read Arab history through the 
lenses of modern Western scholarship. The impact of 
the Ba'th ideology on the Political thought of the Arab 
world is enormous and Michael Aflaq deserves much credit 
for the compelling way in which he placed his beliefs 
2 before the Citizenry and attracted many to his cause. 
Michael Aflaq, the co-founder (with sal ah al- din 
Bitar) of the Ba'th al - ' arabi al - ishtiraki (Arab 
socialist Resurrection) movement, was born in 1910 into a 
Greek Orthodox Christian family in the Maydane quarter, 
a centre of nationalist agitation, of Damascus. His 
1. Nuseibh, Hazem Zaki; The idea of Arab Nationalism 
(Ithaca Corbell University Press, (1956), 
p. 53. 
2. Devlin, John F; The Ba'th Party, A History from 
its (Jrigin to 1968, Stenford University 
California, (1976), p. 23. 
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father a middle class merchant was twice imprisioned for 
his nationalist activities, first by the Ottomans and 
then by the French mandate authorities. Aflaq received 
his secondary education in Damascus and participated in 
the Syrian uprising against the French. 
In 1928 he won a scholarship to the Sorbone 
where he completed a licentiate of history in 1932, 
While in Paris he acquired a thorough knowledge of the 
cultural and philosophic issue of his day. Influenced 
through the intensive study of the works of Anatole 
France, AndreGide, Nietzche, Marx, Dostoievski, Tolstoi 
and Bergson, Aflaq formed a union of Arab students in 
France which set as its goal the independence and unifi-
3 
cation of the Arab. 
The rich intellectual background of Paris had made 
significant impact on Aflaq's mind. He was lured by 
communists to attend some of their meetings but did not 
become member of the communist party, he seems to have 
been fascinated by Marx and may have become in theory, 
if not in practice, a Marxist Above all, he was most 
impressed by communist discipline and tenacity, which 
taught him at first hand the practical methods of a highly 
organised political party. 
3. F.M.A. Card. Arab World File: Cyprus, No. 1129, 
Nov. 29, 1978. 
4. Khadduri , Majid: Arab Contemporaries .-ThePersonal i -
t i e s in P o l i t i c s , John FTopkini Un ive r s i ty 
P r e s s , London,1973, p .214 . 
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Before going to France I was simply a nationalist 
CAflaq said later), 'I had been greatly influenced by my 
father who had taken an active part in the struggle 
against the French and had been imprisioned several 
times. Nationalism was our local reality, but Bitar and 
I discovered socialism in French. On our return we were 
eager to pass on these ideas to a new generation. 
On his return to Damascus in 1932 he started 
teaching at the (Al-Tajhiz) government secondary school. 
He objected to the outdated methods of instruction and 
examination and when after many warnings the minister of 
Education fined him a fifteen days salary deduction he 
resigned from the school along with his colleague Bitar. 
At the same time he made contact with the Syrian 
nationalist leaders to begin to work more particularly 
with the National Bloc; consists of a fire-brand Syrian 
nationalists for the liberation of Syria from the French 
mandate. From 1933 to 1936 he was attracted by communists. 
hoping to get their support to the cause of Arab 
nationalism. During this period he even wrote for the 
communists magazine al-Talia'h (The Vanguard), an 
association which lasted till 1936 because of their 
5. Michael Aflaq to author, Beirut, 3 Jan.,1961; 
quoted in seale, Patrick. The Struggle for 
Syria, 1. B Touris, London^ 1965, p. 148. 
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tacit support to the popular front in " France whose 
position regarding Syria's independence was decidedly 
confusing and ambiguous. 
In 1939 Aflaq founded with Bitar a group (Al Ihya 
-al-Arabi -Al Ba'th al-Arabi) - Arab Renaissance whose 
political and theoretical debates on Arab nationalism 
provided a forum for Aflaq's revolutionary ideas. He 
denounced both the anti-national character of communism 
and the soft stand taken by the national government 
against French domination. 
The message 'Aflaq preached was fundamentally 
Arabism that the Arab as one people - the ummah'Arabiyyah-
had a distinct existence and a special role in the world. 
For him and for his followers this belief was a self-
evident truth, as it was also, for a growing number of 
politically conscious Arabs who did not associate 
themselves with the Ba'th Party or who did not accept all 
of its other doctrines. In Aflaq's view, devotion to and 
love for one's homeland were articles of faith which 
needed no reasoned explanation. Writing in 1940, he 
asserted; 
6. Abujaber, Kamel S; The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party 
History, Ideology and Organization,Syracuse, 
New York, (1966), p.12. 
7. Op. cit. , F.M.A. Card 
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"The nationalism for which we call is 
the same sentiment that binds the indivi-
dual to his family, because the father-
land is only a large household and the 
nation a large family." ° 
From 1940 to 1943 Aflaq alongwith Bitar toyed with 
the idea of establishing a political party based on their 
nationalistic ideas. During this time, at weekly 
meetings in their homes with students and friends, their 
political idea took a concrete form. A Syrian Committee 
was formed in 1941 by Aflaq and Bitar to aid Iraq when 
Rashid Al i carried out his coup-d'elat in an effort to 
offset the British attempt to drag Iraq into the second 
World War. Events in Lebanon in 1943 finally brought 
9 
them the idea of creating a party of fruition. 
By this time Arab students in Syria as well as in 
other countries had become highly politicized, and started 
showing readiness to listen to those revolutionary 
ideological groups who approached them to enlist their 
support in organizing strike and street demonstrations. 
Aflaq Wielded strong influence on several thousands 
young Arabs. In the last analysis, his political strength 
had depended on them as the vehicle of his political 
ideas. 
8. Op. cit., Devlin; John F, p. 24. 
9. Op. cit., Abujaber, Kamel S., p.12 
10. Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid, p. 219. 
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But as a Christian intellectual; 'Aflaq was only 
able to influence Young Muslims to whom religious loyalty 
had become subordinate to national loyalty; but for 
older, to whom religious affiliation was still a primary 
consideration, were not easily won over by the same 
arguments, even although, he often paid high tribute to 
11 
Islam as a necessary ingredient of Arab nationalism. 
As early as 1943, 'he described Islam as part of 
the foundation of Arabism and a response to the Arab 
soul's permanent search for noble and higher spiritual 
pursuits. Consequently to him, the relation of Arab 
nationalism to Islam was unique, and Islam could be 
considered even by Christian Arabs, a national culture. 
This interesting view was in part a preparation for 
further identifying Islam with Arab nationalism and thus 
removing the popular distrust shown by the masses towards 
secular nationalism and secular socialism. The distrust 
naturally was towards socialist theory itself and not 
12 towards its fruits. 
11. Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid, p. 220. 
12. karpat, Kemal H.(ed.); Political and Social 
Thought in Contemporary Middle East^ Pall 
Mall Press, London, (1968), p. 186. 
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Atlaq's own personality was a very strong factor 
in the spread of the party's doctrine and influences. 
Aflaq was neither a dynamic nor a heroic figure, but his 
intensity and devotion to the Arab nation and to the 
principles he believed in were of great influence in 
attracting idealistic followers to the Ba'th cause. 
He was a romantic. Sami-al Jundi - a Bathist describes 
him as having "the guilelessness of a child and the 
aspiration of the old; in his personality were contra-
dictory elements of strength and weakness". He could 
13 inspire people, but he wanted things done his way." 
In 1943 Aflaq and Bitar campaigned for 
nationalists in the general election and Aflaq offered 
himself as a candidate for the same. He failed to be 
elected to parliament probably because of lack of support 
from nationalist leaders. His political platform, in 
essence outlined the basic political principles of the yet 
unborn party, and may be summarized as follows: 
1. Emphasis on the dynamic nationalist idea which 
represents the aspirations of the Arab people. 
2. Emphasis on protecting the integrity and unity of 
Arab culture from the fragmenting influences of 
Western culture. 
13. Op. cit., Devlin, John F; p. 13. 
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3. Rejection of religious factionalism and localism. 
4. Condemnation of communism which represents an 
artificial materialistic progress. 
5. Emphasis on the freedom and unity of the Arab 
World.-^ ^ 
In his writings about Arab nationalism Aflaq 
departs from the apologetic tradition of other Arab 
writers, "We do not proclaim that we are better but that 
we are different". Arabs need not apologize for their 
nationalism, it needs no justification, it is a fact that 
must be accepted". 
After the Ba'th Party was officially organized in 
1947, 'Aflaq tried to control the party through the 
principle of collective leadership. This principle was 
embodied in a National Command composed of representa-
tives from various Arab countries, each controlled by a 
Regional Command. Aflaq acted nominally as the 
Secretary-General of the National Command, but infact he 
failed to provide effective control over the party when 
differences among leaders arose. Elaborate in structure, 
the Central Command lacked coherence and effective 
coordination. 
14. Ismail, tariq Y; The Arab Left, Syracuse Univer-
sity Press, America, (1976), pp.20-21. 
15. Op. cit., Abujaber, Kamel S., p. 14. 
16. Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid, p. 220. 
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In 1947 he sought support of leflist groups in 
general election. He failed again to be elected. 
Nevertheless he tried for a third time to run as a 
candidate in 1949, but failed once more, this time 
presumably because the government was opposed to Ba'th 
representation in parliament. He never ran again for an 
elected post and he began to speak openly in favour of the 
use of violence for social and political change. 
It was in this backdrop that the first National 
Congress of the party met in Damascus in April 4, 1947 
and elected by acclamation Michael Aflaq as a "Dean of 
the party". The party's constitution and internal rules 
in this convention were discussed, written and approved. 
with some changes over the years, these basic documents 
18 have remained almost unaltered. 
The chapter on Fundamental Principles makes the 
firm declaration that the first principles of the party 
are "Unity and Freedom of the Arab Nations". It declared; 
"The Arabs constitute a nation which has the right to live 
in its own state, free to shape its own destiny. For this 
reason, the Arab Ba'th Party considers that:-
17. Ibid., p. 215 
18. See Appendix - 'A' constitution of the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party. 
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1. The Arab territory forms an indivisible political 
and economic unity such that no Arab country can 
fulfil all the conditions necessary for its life 
independent of the other. 
2. The Arab nation forms a spiritual and cultural 
entity and all differences among its children are 
contingent and false and will end with the 
awakening of Arab consciousness. 
3. The Arab land belongs to the Arabs. They alone 
ha""e the right to make use of it and of its riches 
and to shape its destinies. 
The second principle defined the personality of 
the Arab nation and the third the mission of the Arab 
nation. The concept the 'Mission of the Arab Nation' 
deserves a special mention because this provides a key to 
the philosophy of the Ba'th which remains as relevant 
today as it was in 1947 when it was enunciated, for the 
first time. It says: "The Arab nation has a permanent 
mission which takes new and complementary forms according 
to the period of its history. 
Of equal importance and contemporary relavance 
are the chapters called "The General Principles". 
The party's philosophy towards nationalism is 
enshrined in article III of the same chapter, which says; 
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"The Arab Ba'th party is nationalist. It is convinced 
that nationalism is a living and permanent reality, that 
the conscious national feeling that links an individual to 
his nation is strong bond, a sacred feeling - rich in 
creative power, which instills sacrifice, arouses a sense 
of responsibility and contributes concrete and useful 
orientation to an individual's humanism. 
The nationalist idea called for by the party is 
the wish of the Arab people to free and to unite 
themselves to enjoy the possibility of realising the Arab 
personality in history and to cooperate with all nations 
on anything that can ensure humanity of a straight path 
19 towards well-being and prosperity." 
Aflaq had been a political prisoner several times. 
In 1939 the French arrested him; in 1948 the national 
government of Shukri al-Quwatli; send him behind the 
bar: subsequently in 1949 the leader of the first Syrian 
coup de'tat Husni al - Zaim, and in 1952 and 1954 Adib -
al Shishkali arrested and detained him on various 
charges. In 1952 although he escaped from prison to 
Lebanon, but Shishkali pressed the Lebanese government to 
deport him and he had to take exile in Italy for four 
months. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Op. cit., Abujaberm Kamel S., p. 13. 
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Since its inception the Ba'th Party actively involved 
itself with the Palestinian movement, spear-heading the 
formation of "Association of Palestinian liberation whose 
main task was to organize volunteers for the popular 
armed struggle for the preservation of the character of 
21 Palestine. 
The defeat of the Arabs in Palestine gave the 
Ba'th Party its first real plung into the inner current 
of Arab politics. The Ba'th had been warning Arab 
governments since 1946 to prepare for the coming 
struggle. In 1947 and 1948 it had warned against relying 
on the United Nations to solve the problem: "The solution 
of the Palestine problem is in Palestine, not at the 
United Nations."^^ 
The birth of radical Arab nationalism can be 
traced to the palestine war in 1948 and the consequent 
emergence of the Israel. So traumatic to the Arab masses 
was the loss of palestine and the alien cleavage of the 
Arab homeland that it fostered a transformation of the 
movement of unity. 
21. Berindranath, Dewan; Iraq, The Land of Arab 
Resurgence India, (1979), p. 25. 
22. Op. cit., Abujaber, Kamel, S; p. 28. 
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The Palestine defeat sounded the deathknell of 
liberal nationalism in the Arab World, and with it had 
come the growing rejection of Western model of government. 
The Palestine defeat sparked the re-evaluation or Arab 
society; and from this has arisen what may be called 
radical Arab nationalism - a nationalism dedicated to 
fundamental social change to achieve the objectives of 
23 freedom and unity. 
Speaking on the concept of freedom Movements the 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, Af1aq thus observed 
"... Zionism is an internal 
creation of Western imperialism. It 
is a frightful creation but its end 
result will be failure. 
There could not have been a more 
dangerous weapon than Zionism to 
direct against the Arabs. The 
Western historical enmity to the 
Arabs together with its greed and 
imperialist appetite for usurpation 
and exploitation has created the 
Zionist front which fraudulently 
resembles some Arab characteris-
tics... The difference between 
Zionism and Arab nationalism is very 
great in that the Zionist movement 
and its existence appears to be an 
inverted, multilated and contra-
dictory stance to that of the entity 
of Arabs, their subsistance, their 
spirit and their aspirations. 
23. Op. cit., Ismail, Tariq Y; pp. 12-13 
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m 
...A comparison with Zionism ref-
lects the weakness of Zionism and 
its drawbacks which make its 
failure inevitable. These drawbacks 
are present among the ranks of 
Zionist jews along with their 
aggressiveness as one of their 
tendencies. They came as invaders 
and aggressors. They were wrong in 
their aggression though seeking its 
justification. Moreover, Zionism 
came reinforced by imperialism and 
stood on the side of reaction and 
backwardness in this age armed with 
illwill and aggression." 24 
From then on, Arab politics was never to be the 
same, ,change did indeed take place. Within seven years of 
the Palestine defeat, the Ba'th, which in 1947 wa-s 
composed of only a handful of followers, was at the hel 
of Syrian politics and had become a major movement in 
Jordan and Iraq as well. By 1955 there had been three 
coup-de ' tat in Syria, a change of regime in Lebanon, a 
revolution in Egypt, a revolution in Algeria against the 
French, the assassination of King Abdullah in Jordan and 
the assassination of lesser political figure in West 
Asia. The Ba'th certainly capitalized on the failure of 
traditional Arab leaders to conduct a better campaign in 
25 Palestine. -^  
24. Afiaq, Michael; The Ba'th and the Heritage, A 
Collection of Speeches Ey Aflaq. Composed 
by Rajendra, Ravindra (Pvt) Ltd., New Delhi, 
July 1976, pp. 81-84. 
25. Op, cit., Abujaber, Kamel S., pp. 29-30. 
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Until the 1950s, the Ba'th Party got along with a 
simple organizational apparatus. The Secretary General 
and his three main executive committees ran the party. 
Aflaq and Bitar lived and worked in Damascus, where 
involvement in Syrian national politics and editing and 
publishing . the party newspaper, al-Ba'th, were their 
principle activities. They, in effect, constituted the 
party headquarters. 
But the growth in number of branches, the 
establishment of a party organization in distant Iraq, 
presaging such organizations elsewhere, and finally, the 
merger of the Ba'th Party and Hawrani's Arab Socialist 
Party, in January 1953 made adoption of a more formal 
organization imperative. In the early 1950s, therefore, 
a formal terminology for the party organization in the 
several Arab states was worked out. It drew on language 
and terminology which 'Aflaq, at any rate, had used in 
his writings as early as the mid - 1930s. The party 
27 
considered the entire Arab World as the nation (al-qawm): 
The Ba'th was first in the field as an organized 
Pan - Arab political movement. First in Syria, then in 
26. Op. cit., Devlin, John F; p. 15. 
27. Ibid., p. 16 
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Iraq, Jordan and elsewhere, those truly committed to 
Pan-Arab unity in the late forties and fifties turned to 
it in large numbers. Work for Arab unity gave members 
none of the problems that some other principles of Ba'th 
28 doctrine did. 
While many progressive and nationalist groups in 
the Arab world strongly denounced these moves, Ba'thist 
alone were able to provide an ideological framework to 
this opposition by pointing out in the clearest possible 
terms the need for the Arabs to national ise and pool 
their national resources to fight the onslaught of 
imperialism. Writing in the Ba'thist organ, Michael 
Aflaq went on hammering the point that "the only effective 
way of fighting imperialism was for the Arabs to declare 
unquestioned sovereignty over all their natural resources 
including oil fields, water ways and territorial 
29 
waters."^  
Egypt's involvement in the politics of Arab 
nationalism seemed in 1955 to be a matter of urgent state 
policy in countering Iraqi commitment to the Baghdad Pact. 
It is partly in this context that one must consider the 
decision of the Nasir Regime to declare Egypt an 'Arab 
28. Ibid., p. 53. 
29. Op. cit., Berindranath, Dewan; p. 44. 
62 
State' for the first time in modern history. The 1956 
Egyptian constitution declared in its first article, 
'Egypt is a sovereign independent Arab State and the 
Egyptian people are an integral part of the Arab nation. 
The vociferous - if not material support of Egypt by 
other Arab, states during the Suez War encouraged her more 
30 
active involvement in the Arab nationalist movement. 
By the, end of 1957 the Ba'th party seemed 
entrenched in Syria. To all appearences, it had gained 
all it wanted. But a struggle was going on between the 
Ba'th and its ally,the Communist Party. The communists -
the Arif Bizri - Khalid al - Azim coalition - hoped for 
closer ties with the Soviet Union that would ultimately 
bring them to power. By now the Ba'th realized, it had 
been used by the communists, who were in powerful position 
in Syria. Just as it thought it was on the threshold of 
power, the Ba'th discovered that its ally and collaborator 
the communist party was getting strong - too strong for 
the Ba'th party alone to fight. To avert a communist 
takeover in Syria, the Ba'th clamored for unity with 
c <- 31 Egypt. 
30. Vatiklotis, P.J; Conflict in the Middle East, 
Aldine Atherton, U.K.,(1971),p. 25. 
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Ba'th Party was also in need of effective 
leadership who could command the respect of the Ba'th 
leaders. Aflaq saw in Nasir^ the kind of leadership his party 
needed - a man possessing leadership qualities with a 
32 
Charisma appealing to the massess. 
At the formation of the UAR the Ba'th seemed 
to have reached the height of its ambition. The first 
actual union of "dismembered" Arab nations became a 
reality mainly through the party efforts. To which Aflaq 
stated "We hoped that the party would have a basic and 
responsible share in the governing of the new nntion 
which he helped to create. We hoped our role would be 
both practical and theoretical since it was we who began 
preaching socialist ideas at least fifteen years before 
33 f^esir assumed power". 
But contrary to his expectations, this experiment 
proved utterly disastrous to his party. Nasir, who 
cooperated at the very outset with Ba'th leaders paid 
little or no attention to their ideology; he was 
apparently interested in Ba'th only as a means to dominate 
32. Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid; pp. 220-221. 
33. Op. cit., Abujal^er Kamel , S; pp. 47-48. 
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Syria. Consequently, some leaders especially Bitar and 
Hawrani, turned against Naslr and supported Syria's 
secession In 1961. This move, which seemed to have been 
opposed by the majority, caused a serious split among party 
leaders which Aflaq. could neither prevent nor repair. 
Consequently, he suffered a loss of control over the 
bosses, and the split in leadership continued to exist. 
Each faction, Including 'Aflaq's own, was now claiming to 
represent the true principles of the Ba'th ideology: Some 
members defected on the ground that Naslr no longer had 
faith in the Ba'th party. Aflaq's failure to exercise 
effective leadership proved to be not only the principle 
weakness of the party but also the rock on which its 
entire structure had been wrecked. 
A new stage in the history of the Ba'th party 
commenced following the dissolution of the Syrian-Egyptian 
union. Tills stage was characterized by deep Internal 
schisms and a reconsideration of the party's basic 
ideological positions. 
With the assistance of some nationalist elements, 
on February 8, 1963, the Ba'th led a military coup 
against the regime of Abd al - Karim Qasim. Directly 
34. Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid; p.221. 
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after, it mounted a policy of recrimination and physical 
liquidation against Iraqi communists, Qasimites, and 
opponents to their rule. At the same time, it reasserted 
the party's commitment to Arab unity. One month following 
the Iraq-" coup the Ba'th party led another successful 
coup in Syria which similarly raised the banner of Arab 
unity. Both regimes of the Ba'th undertook to negotiate 
a union with Egypt. However, the agreement reached with 
35 that country was soon discarded. 
A Sixth National Conference, meeting in Damascus 
between October 5 and 23, 1963, to discuss the new 
developments, witnessed new organizational and ideological 
divisions. The conference directed its two branches in 
Syria and Iraq to announce an Immediate union between the 
two countries. Though formally declared, the union was 
never implemented and led to disagreement between the 
Ba'thists on the one hand, and Iraqi President Abdul 
Salam Arif (a self-proclaimed pro-Nasserite at the time), 
on the other. Another important consequence of this 
disaster was the emergence of a strong leftlist trend. 
Its proponents, adopting Marxist concepts and tools of 
analysis, subjected most party doctrines to critical re-
evaluation and questioned-in particular - the thought of 
35. Op. cit., Ismail, Tariq Y; pp. 27, 
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Michael Aflaq. The ideological line of those leflists 
was later approved by the party after bitter and lengthy 
discussion and was issued in leaflet entitled, 'Some 
Of. 
Theoretical Principles'. Al-Razzaz (an eminent 
Ba'thists intellectual, General-Secretary of the party in 
1965, and a member of the National Command) concluded 
that the Ba'th Party was decisively split into military 
and civilian factions. Later on the civilian faction in 
Syria, infact, never able to regain control, and the 
National Command, seated in Damascus, and the Syrian 
Regional Command eventually came under the complete 
domination of the military faction. 
Within the military faction, however, intense 
intrigues developed. Ameen al-Hafiz, who become 
President in 1964, concentrated power in his hands 
gaining control over the state and the party. This 
alienated other members of the faction. On February 22, 
1966, military coup, against him, led by Salah Jadeed 
succeded in assuming power. The new leadership, accusing 
its opponents of being rightists, banished Michael Aflaq, 
Salah al-din al-Bitar, and Amin al-hafiz from Syria and 
dismissed them from the party. 
36. Ibid., p. 28, 
37. Ibid., p. 30 
67 
In 1964 'Aflaq, no longer in control over the 
party, left first for Europe and then, after a short 
visit to Syria in 1966 (relinquishing his positiion of 
Secretary-General in favour of Munif al-Razzaz), for 
Brazil to live with relatives for two years. He was 
still in Brazil when the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 
broke out. Despite defeat in the war, military officers 
continued to dominate the Ba'th Party, although leadership 
38 
changed hands from one officer to another. 
In Syria, the humiliation suffered during the 
Six-Day War was attributed to the military's failure to 
stand up to the challenge and to decisions made in the 
name of Ba'th without consultation with civilian leaders. 
Consequently, the regional commands of the other Arab 
countries felt compelled to act independently, and there 
was a growing feeling that the time had come to 
reinstall 'Aflaq in his former position of leadership. 
Aflaq made no move to return from Brazil until after the 
'Iraqi Ba'th leaders seized power in 1968 and began to 
urge Ba'thists in other countries to acknowledge his 
control over the National Command. After the 'Iraqi Ba'th 
38. Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid; p. 222. 
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leaders seized power In July 1968, AFlaq returned to the 
Arab World, presumably at the Invitation of Ahmad Hasan 
al-Bakr, Ba'thist President of the 'Iraq Republic, to 
resume his position as Secretary-General of the Party. 
After his return, 'he again became active in politics and 
tried to rally popular forces behind the 'Iraqi 
leaders; this put him in disfavour in the eyes of Syrian 
Ba'th leaders - indeed, these leaders were so enraged that 
39 they condemned him to death in absentia in 1971. 
In the formative years of the party he seemed to 
enjoy the respect and loyalty of some rival factions, but 
most have preferred to remain apart and have refused to 
unite into one party, each claiming to represent 
fundamental Ba'thist principles more faithfully than the 
other. In short, the lack of effective leadership 
continued to exist despite 'Aflaq's renewed efforts at 
coordination. 
39. Ibid., pp. 222-223, 
CHAPTER - IV 
MICHAEL AFLAQ AND THE BA'THIST IDEOLOGY 
In contradiction to local nationalism, the Ba'th 
Party has expounded a national ideology broader in scope 
and basic assumptions and steeped in Arab culture and 
historical heritage. It is true, as Munif al-Razzaz, 
one of the Ba'th leaders, stated that Arab nationalism 
was based on several factors, including geography and 
culture but the significance of each factor varied from 
one school of thoughtt to another. Razzaz maintained 
that there is the broad concept of Arab nationalism, which 
the Ba'th party advocated, and the narrow local 
nationalism, reflecting parochial feeling, which would be 
eventually superseded by Arab nationalism. 
Arab nationalism, in Michael Aflaq's view, is 
the embodiment of the Arab spirit. To him nationalism 
means, "a striving towards the national goal and a will to 
1. Khadduri, Majid; Political Trends in the Arab-
world, John Hopkins, London, (1970), p.194. 
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progress which awakens whenever the nation's course of 
progress is. retarded or existing conditions deteriorate 
and the nation lags behind the progress of the world. 
Arab nationalism is thus the "procession" of the Arab 
nation towards the realization of its needs and 
aspirations. These aspirations embody the views of the 
nation on life and society, now and in the future, and are 
the product of the nation's character and the values which 
it wants to realize. In other words, Arab nationalism 
is now an emanation of all the interacting inner forces, 
values, and ambitions held by the Arab nation: this 
nation has a mission which is the realization of its 
ideal. The process of this realization constitutes the 
Arab nation's experiences in the awakening of its people, 
solving their problems and raising their standard of 
"2 living. 
This belief is repeated in the opening article of 
the Ba'th Party constitution of 1947 which says: "The 
Arabs form one nation. This nation has the natural right 
to live in a single state and to be free to direct its own 
"3 destiny. 
2. Ibid., p. 195. 
3. Seo Appendix - A, Constitution of the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party. 
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Aflaq went back to the most important historical 
experience of the Arab people for the foundation of his 
doctrine of the special mission of the Arab nation. 
In a speech given at Damascus University at the celebra-
tion of the Prophet's birthday, he declares; 
"Today we give the name "Patriot" or 
"Nationalist" to certain persons of 
the nation (ummah)... Meaning by it 
those persons who have faith in 
their country's cause... so in the 
past the Muslim was the Arab, with 
faith in the new religion, because 
he combined the qualities necessary 
to understand that this religion 
represented a bold move of Arabism 
(urubah) toward unity, power, and 
upward progress ... the power of 
Islam ... has revived to appear in 
our days under a new form, that of 
Arab nationalism (qawmiyyah) ...." 
In 1950 'Aflaq reiterated the significance of 
Islam for his movement, but stressed that the State he 
conceived for the Arabs was a secular institution, 
founded on a social base, or nationalism, and a moral 
base, or freedom. From this he concluded that although 
the State wculd be secular by virtue of freeing religion 
from the ifoke of political life, it would also be the 
opposite of atheism and corruption. 
4. Devlin, John F; The Ba'th Party, A History from 
its origin to 1966, Hoover Institution 
Press, California, (1976), p. 25. 
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In his book, Fi Sabil al-ba'th (Toward the Ba'th), 
two comparative lengthy articles are devoted to religion. 
The first, dated March 1956, appears to be a rebuttal of 
the accusation of atheism or Marxism hurled against the 
Ba'th by its enemies. 
"We consider (athesim) a spurious attitude toward 
life... for life means faith and the atheist is a liar.... 
But we look on atheism as a pathological phenomenon 
that should be cured by diagnosing symptoms." 
In the second article, dated April 1956, he 
completely rejects the Marxist concept of religion. Any 
critique of religion in the Arab world, he maintains, 
would amount to challenging what the people consider 
sacred and invaluable, and would eventually create a 
barrier between the party and the masses. 
In the present historical situation, Aflaq 
concludes, Islam shows the need to devote all efforts to 
strengthening of the Arabs and the in provement of the 
conditions of the Arabs. For Aflaq, Islam is Arab 
nationalism, and any other kind of Islam is either 
degenerate or an imposition of Western imperialism; 
crrversely, todt<y the only defender of Islam are the 
Bezirgan, Najm A; "Islam and Arab Nationalism", 
Curtis Michael (ed); Religion and Politics 
in the Middle East, Westview Press/Boulder, 
CoTarado, (1981), p. 501. 
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Arab nationalists. The Arabs, indeed, he goes on to say, 
have no need to distinguish between nationalism and 
religion because, the relationship of Islam to Arabism 
is not like the relation of any other religion to any 
other nationalism. When there national consciousness 
awaken completely, he goes on, speaking of the Arab 
Christians, "...and when they will regain their 
uncorrupted characteristics, the Arab Christian will 
recognise that Islam constitutes for them a national 
culture in which they must immerse themselves so that they 
may understand and love it, and so that they may preserve 
Islam as they would preserve the most precious element in 
their Arabism." 
Essential to his thought is his clarification of 
the terms patriotism and nationalism, concepts which to 
him represent the two single most important ties binding 
individuals to each other. Patriotism (al-wataniyya ) 
is love of the fatherland (al-watan) and a feeling of 
inward commitment (irtibat batini) toward it; nationalism 
(al qawmiyya ) is love of nation (al-ummah) and a similar 
feeling of Inward commitment. The nation is defined as a 
group of human beings bound by mutually recognized ties 
of language and history, and the fatherland as the 
6. Halm, Sylvia G (ed); Arab Nationalism: An 
Anthology, University ol' California Press, 
Los Angeles and London, (1962), p.64. 
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territory inhabited by this special group of people. 
Traditionally used to denote the entire political and 
religious community of Islam, the world al ummah implies 
to Aflaq a secular rather than a religious identification. 
It is the Arab and not the Islamic Ummah with which he is 
concerned. A close interrelationship exists between 
patriotism and nationalism since love of the fatherland 
naturally entails a love for the people inhabiting it, 
and, similarly, love of the nation implies a love of the 
land on which that nation lies. 
When al-Watan and al-Wataniyya are applied in the 
broadest sense by Aflaq, they appear to be almost inter-
changeable with al-ummah and al-qawmiyya . From the 
general tone of his works, however, it is evident that 
al-ummah is a higher concept than al-watan and that 
loyalty to the nation is a correspondingly nobler 
sentiment. 
"Arabism" (al-'urubah) is another word frequently 
employed by Aflaq. It is less a definable term than an 
emotive symbol signifying the existence of Arabness, the 
embodiment of Arab nationalism and a belief in Arab unity. 
That is how the Ba'thists reject the Western 
theory of nation state being a political entity and 
instead emphasize the moral, spiritual, and dynamic 
qualities which people possess through their heritage. 
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dreams and aspirations to qualify them for being called a 
nation. An authoritative translation of the Arab Bathist 
position explaining their view-point on Nationalism and 
Arab regions, invariably appears in all their publications 
as a sort of preface. It would be revealing to go through 
it. It says "The Arab socialist Ba'th party regards all 
Arabs as being part of one nation both in cultural and 
spiritual sense. The different countries in which they 
live, make up a politically and economically united 
fatherland. In the party's documents, the Arab father-
land means all the Arab countries. Each of these is a 
'Qutr' which, literally translated, means country; in the 
Ba'th context, it should be read as province or region. 
The adjective 'Qurti' (provincial or regional) is used 
when referred to an individual country." 
The Arab has been defined as early as the first 
congress of the Arab Ba'th socialist party in 1947. The 
constitution the party adopted, laid down "an Arab is any 
one whose language is Arabic, who lives on Arab land or 
aspires to live there and who is convinced of his 
belonging to the Arab nation". (Article 3 & 22)^ 
7. Berindranath, Dewan; Iraq, the Land of Arab 
Resurgence, Press Asia International, New 
Delhi, (1979), p.9. 
8. Op. cit.. Appendix - A, Constitution of the Arab 
Ba'th Socialist Party. 
76 
The definition of the 'Arab' in itself makes it 
clear that the Ba'thtst faith in the nationalist idea is 
not a fanatical concept as has been propagated by many a 
philosopher of Europe. The very first resolution of the 
party in 1947, emphasized the point that Arab nationalism 
was an integral factor of world humanism and was to 
develop in harmony with humanistic principles. It made 
it abundantly clear that Arab desires for unity, 
liberation and collaboration among the Arabs is in the 
context of the good of the humanity as a whole, and aims 
towards the creation of a free harmonious and peaceful 
9 
world progressing continuously. 
The Arab Ba'th socialist party had declared, "the 
concept of nationalism that we propose is marked above 
all by a spirit of brotherhood. It proceeds from the same 
feelings that tie its family members to its home, for we 
consider that a homeland is one vast heart and that a 
nation is one large family." 
To him Arab nationalism is formulated as an 
ideology which would achieve its goals in two stages, each 
stage embodied in a movement intimately connected with the 
9. Op. cit., Berindranath, Dewan; p. 12. 
10. Ibid. , p. 13. 
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other. The first is the emancipation^ f^e:?;6^ a&-:J;aiias from 
imperialism, the second the unification of Arab 
homeland. The first can not completely disappear until 
the second one is realized. There seems to be nothing 
new in this formulation, for Arab thinkers have been 
calling for independence and unity long before the Ba'th 
came into existence. But the Ba'th party was perhaps the 
first ideological group to put forth Arab unity as a 
primary demand and to call for a revolutionary approach to 
achieve it. The Ba'th's call for unity came indeed at a 
time when the Arabs were in greater need for it, that is, 
when it became evident that the Arabs were unable to 
stand up to Israel as a result of disunity. The Ba'th 
expressed this point in its well-known slogan of "common 
Arab destiny", which was an apt cry against bickering 
Arab leaders who revealed their negativism, traditional-
ism, and vested interests 11 
The insistence of the Ba'th party on tying 
socialism to nationalism is made for the purpose of 
effecting a better standard of living internally. Such a 




Op. cit., Khadduri, Majid; pp. 195-196. 
Abujaber, Kamel S; Arab Ba'th Socialist Party 
History, Ideology and Organization, Syracuse 
University Press, New York, rT5F6) , p.115. 
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The most important slogan of the Ba'th Party is 
"One Arab Nation with an Eternal Mission". And its 
constitution States that the "Arab nation has an eternal 
mission", what is this mission and what does it aim for? 
The constitution again says that the mission reveals itself 
"in ever and new related forms through the different 
stages in history. It aims at the renewal of human 
values, at the quickening of human progress, at 
increasing harmony and mutual help among nations". Such 
an undertaking results in opposition to colonialism and 
support of all national liberation movements throughout 
the world.-^  
The programme of the Ba'th party is based on 
three principles (1) unity (2) freedom and (3) socia-
lism. Tha struggle for unity is not conceived simply in 
straightforward pan-Arab terms as the elimination of 
divisive political boundaries; it is seen as a regenera-
tive process leading to reform of Arab character and 
society. This can only come about when Arabs free 
themselves from all regional, religious, and communal 
loyalties, Liberate themselves from all 'ambivalence' and 
submit to the external values of mankind. Unity, there-
fore, is not merely a clear cut political objective; 
13. Ibid. , p. 116. 
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It is a search for the 'treasure of hidden vltaUly', the 
moral and spiritual founts of nationalism. 
A cardinal point that dominated the literature of 
the party and occupied the minds and hearts of party 
adherence was the question of unity. Writing in 1962, 
Michael Aflaq noted that "the aim of the Arab unity is the 
strongest and deepest motivation for the existence of the 
Arab Ba'th socialist party as a popular revolutionary and 
progressive movement". In the constitution of the Ba'th, 
innumerable references were made to the need and plausi-
bility of unifying Arab countries. The existing divisions 
and frontiers were shunned as fabrications of colonial 
powers with no substantive reality to them. Unity was 
considered an existing reality that merely needs to be 
embodied in formal institutions. A primary object of the 
party was to break down and eradicate the barriers 
separating the Arabs. 
Speaking on "The Nobility of a Nation lies in its 
capacity for continuous struggle", Michael Aflaq at the 
14. Ismail, Tariq Y; The Arab Left, Syracuse Universi-
ty Press, New York, (1976), p. 32. 
15. Seale, Patrick; The Struggle for Syria: A Study of 
Post War Arab Politics 1945-58, TTT. Tauris 
and Co. Ltd., London (1965), p. 154. 
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Party's Preparatory School on January 19, 1976 
reiterated; 
"... We delayed the Arab revolution 
in its phases, in its march towards 
unity and in applying our revolu-
tionary doctrine of unity in practi-
cal terms. We in the Ba'th party 
did not believe in unity which came 
by itself, a kind of inert and 
frozen unity. We believed in a 
dynamic, assertive and powerful 
unity, which knew that the passage 
of time might go against it and that 
it should impose itself on the 
contemporary scene and destroy the 
other negative forces. This was 
the unity which was the basis of our 
Ba'thist doctrine and approach. 
When the Arab revolution did not 
proceed along the path of unity, the 
imperialists and the Zionists 
threatened to divide one country 
into many....Tranquillity, inaction 
and complacence are no more possible 
in the national and International 
circumstances in which we live, 
because when the enemies, the 
imperialists and the Zionists fight 
us, they employ weapons and also 
hatch conspiracies considering the 
weight of Arab unity which, unfortu-
nately, has not yet been achieved. 
They know the danger of unity and so 
they fight unity before it becomes 
an established fact and before we 
march towards it. Therefore, in all 
circumstances, whether we march 
towards unity or retreat, we still 
carry the burden of unity on our 
shoulders. We face hostility to the 
extent we pose a threat by our unity 
to our enemies. Logic tells us that 
as long as we continue to bear this 
burden we shall advance towards 
unity and achieve it." 
16. Af]aq Michael; Ba'th and the Heritage A Collec-
tion of Speeches Ey Michael Arlaq, printed 
at Rajendra Ravindra Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 
(1976), pp. 19-20. 
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The intensity and magnitude of nationalist 
feelings are most clearly absorbed, however in Article 3 
of the constitution. To the Ba'th the article thus 
stipulated, "the feeling of nationalism which closely 
binds the individual to his nation is a sacred feeling, 
charged with creative power, impelling to sacrifice, 
inspiring a sense of responsibility, directing the 
humanity of the individual along a practical and fruitful 
course." Based on the above the party set three integ-
rated objectivesfor itself. 
(1) The struggle against foreign imperialism for the 
complete and absolute liberation of the Arab 
homeland. 
(2) The struggle to bring together all Arabs in a 
single Arab State. 
(3) The over throw of the existing corrupt order by a 
revolution that shall embrace all aspects of life-
intellectual, economic, social and political. 
For more than two decades, this Ba'th notion of 
Arab unity remained almost unaltered. The experience 
gained by the 1958 Egyptian - Syrian Union and its 
dissolution in 1961, however, enriched and transformed 
the theoretical formulation of this notion. In 1963 in 
17. Op. cit., Ismail, Tariq Y; p. 33, 
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the Sixth National Conference of the Ba'th, for instance, 
the conference criticized the high-level abstraction in the 
concept of unity and the party's over-emphasis of unity to 
the neglect of socialism. % e Co nference also directed the 
Ba'th provincial leadership in Iraq and Syria to unify the 
two countries. The directive, however, was not realized 
due to the internal disagreements and conflicts within 
the party. The assumption to power of Hafiz al-Assad in 
1970 witnessed the last Ba'thist attempt at unity. 
Following negotiations between Egypt, Syria and Libya, a 
union of Arab Republics was declared in 1971, but this, 
19 too could not be materialized. 
The party also strongly believes that sovereignty 
belongs to the people which alone is the source of all 
authority and leadership, that the value of the State is 
measured by the support it received from the masses, and 
that its sanctity is contingent upon the freedom they 
would enjoy in the choice of their government. It is, 
moreover committed to create objective conditions 
conducive to the exercise of full rights by the citizens 
18. For details see appendix - B; Decisions of the 
Sixth National Convention of the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party,1963. 
19. Op cit., Ismail, Tariq Y; pp. 34-35. 
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in the individual capacity as well as in national life. 
These include establishment of a constitutional represen-
tative system requiring the executive to be responsible to 
the legislative, independence of the judiciary, and a 
single code of laws for all citizens in harmony with the 
spirit of the present age.^° Central to 'Aflaq's 
thinking is the quest for freedom, conceived not merely 
as emancipation from political tyranny and oppressive 
poverty, but the liberation of the Arab people, unified 
in mind and spirit, joined together in social brotherhood. 
Freedom should, therefore, emanate from the very soul of 
the Arab and be cherished as an indivisible part of his 
cultural heritage. Here again the path to freedom is that 
of struggle strewn with sacrifice. Since such a generic 
conception of freedom could not be achieved or even 
promoted without state action, especially in the education 
of the masses, the political machinery of the state had to 
be freed from the grip of the privileged classes, 
considered to be custodians of the feudal past, and 
Intrinsically opposed to the Idea of the Inqilab. For 
that purpose Aflaq and his supporters advocated the prompt 
implementation of a radical program of socialism designed 
20. Agwani M.S; "Ba'thist Revolution in Iraq: The 
Ideological Bases", Engineer Asghar Al i 
(ed.); Islam and Revolution, Ajanta Publi-
cation, Delhi, (1984), p. 42. 
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to eradicate the economic power, and hence political 
domination, of the high landowners, business and commer-
cial magnates, and give the people a stronger sense of 
belonging to society through direct ownership of land and 
plant. 
The constitution of the Ba'th Party provides for 
the freedom of speech, press association, and religion: 
(Art 41). These freedoms are to be limited not by a 
clearly defined law but by the vague words "within the 
22 
national interest". 
Perhaps Aflaq, more than any other writer, sees 
the ills of Arab society as a result of weakness in the 
Arab "self". Thus he demands an end to the evasion of 
responsibility. He deems necessary a regeneration of 
those noble values within each individual that once made 
the Arab nation strong. 
Aflaq is very frank in his approach to the problem 
of personal freedom. At one point he is merciless in his 
treatment of those who do not accept the tutelage of the 
21. Kalyani, Nabil, M. "The Rise of the Syrian, Ba'th 
1940: Political success, Party Failure", 
IJMES, Vol.3, (1972), p.6. 
22. Op. cit.. Appendix - A; Constitution of the Arab 
Ba'th Socialist Party. 
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vanguard during the 'Inqilab' period. In effect, he wants 
to force them to be free. He says, "Our mercilessness has 
for its objective to restore them to their true selves 
which they ignore, to their hidden will which they have 
not yet clearly discerned and which is with us even though 
23 their Swords are against us. 
The Ba'th constitution calls for a "Parliamentary 
Constitutional Regime" (Art. 14). The constitution also 
states that the people are to be the sole source of power 
and authority. Sovereignty should belong to the people 
(Art 5). Emphasizing their democratic spirit, the 
Constitution also insists on a decentralized government 
(Art 16). Decentralization is required to curb the power 
of the bureaucracy and secure more popular participation 
24 in government. 
Socialism, the third of the Ba'th slogans, is also 
intimately bound up with other elements of the party 
doctrine. In fact, Aflaq in an early writing (1946) went 
so far at one point as to equate it with nationalism. He 
says, "The Arab nationalists are the socialists, hence 
there is neither incompatibility nor contribution nor war 
25 between nationalists and socialists." 
23. Op. cit. , Abujaber, Kamel S; pp. 125-126. 
24. Op. cit., Appendix - A; Constitution of the Arab 
Ba'th Socialist Party. 
25. Op. cit., Devlin, John F; p. 32. 
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The concept of Arab socialism actually existed for 
many centuries before modern Arab nationalism came upon 
the scene. Its roots were planted long before Marx. 
They Lie deep in the soil of Islam and in the cultural 
heritage of the Arabs. 
The idea of socialism has long been the subject 
of discussion in the Arab World, but Arab nationalists 
showed no great interest in it mainly because the over-
riding principle of Arab Union was uppermost in their 
minds. Young Arabs who exhibited concern about social 
problems tended to become socialists or communists, and 
paid little or no attention to Arab union. Such was the 
trend of thought among young men before world war - II. 
It was the Ba'th thinkers who made the first attempt to 
reconcile the two divergent view points and demonstrated 
that Arab union can not be achieved or possible endure 
27 
unless it is based on socialism. 
In the pre-1947 writings of Michael Aflaq, 
"Socialism signifies an ardent commitment to social 
justice unsupported by any serious comprehension of the 
socio-economic realities of Arab life or of the ways and 
means to achieve the socialist goal. "My concern is not", 
26. Said Abdel Moghny, Arab Socialism, London, Bland-
ford Press, (1972), p. 24. 
27. Khadduri, Majid; Republlean Iraq, Oxford Universi-
ty Press, London, (1969), p. 247. 
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wrote Aflaq in 1936, "that people should be equal in the 
distribution of food but that every individual should be 
allowed to realize his gifts and potential. We are not 
concerned about alleviating misery (we are concerned 
28 
about) increasing the wealth of life". 
The Ba'th constitution is a little more specific 
in that it incorporated a series of propositions pres-
cribing national ownership of major natural resources and 
public utilities, ceiling on agricultural holdings, 
worker's participation in management and share in profits, 
and equitable distribution of wealth. But the over all 
pattern it envisaged was one of moderate socialism 
complete with class co-operation and protection of the 
29 
rights of private property and of inheritance. 
The constitution does specify the economic plan of 
the party. Article 26 described the Ba'th as a socialist 
party claiming that all the economic resources of the 
Arab nation should be owned by Arabs themselves. Article 
27 declared that this economic wealth had been distributed 
unjustly; hence, it should be redistributed equally among 
28.Op. cit.. Engineer Asghar Ali; p. 59. 
29. Ibid., p. 59. 
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the people. It followed in Article 28 that the exploi-
tation of man by man was condemned, for all citizens are 
equal. The state manipulation of the means of production 
was also approved by virtue of Article 29. The afore-
mentioned article clearly stated that the state should run 
co-operations of public interest natural resources, 
30 factors of production, and the means of transportation. 
Aflaq wrote in 1950 "... socialism in the Arab 
Ba'th is limited to economic organization that aims to 
reconsider the distribution of wealth in the Arab father-
land and to lay out economic basis which would guarantee 
equality and economic justice among the citizens...." 
Again in 1955, after explaining that socialism could be 
defined as a doctrine or a system, with specific origins, 
Aflaq wrote that "all of these were reducible to the 
simple statement that socialism is the sharing of the 
31 
resources of the country by its citizens. 
Speaking on Militant Arab Nationalism as cited in 
'selections from a collection of articles and speeches by 
the founder of the Ba'th Party, Fisabil al-Ba'th (for the 
Resurrection, Beirut, 1959), Aflaq further explains his 
positions; 
29. Ibid., p. 59. 
30. Op. cit.. Appendix - A; Constitution of the Arab 
Ba'th Socialist Party. 
31. Op. cit., Devlin, John F., p. 34. 
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"When we say that we are in need of an Arab 
socialismj all we mean is that attention should be given 
to the special circumstances that pertain to us as Arabs 
in this phase of our history. We all agree as to the 
principle of socialism, but not as to the manner in which 
it should be applied or to the place it should occupy in 
our national life. We can not accept the view of Western 
socialism that nationalism is merely a transient phase in 
the process of economic evolution. On the contrary, 
socialism must be suited to our national and to our 
political struggle, and not become an instrument of 
conspirary against our fatherland, or a means of internal 
division and strife, or a screen for antinationalist 
maneuvers. 
We want socialism to serve our nationalist cause, 
to increase our intellectual daring, and to strengthen our 
call for individual freedom and the fruitfulness and 
richness of our spirit-not to kill our new freedom in its 
cradle.... 
. . .What would become of Arab thought if it were 
overcome by an artificial philosophy such as communist 
socialism.... With all that is false and destorted in 
this philosophy? If we adopt (communist) socialism as 
our philosophy of life... then we shall destroy the 
32 future of Arab thought and its freedom with our own hands." 
32. Sh/jrabi, Hisham; Nationalism and Revolution in 
the Arab World, The Middle East and North 
Africa, London (1966), p. 111. 
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Michael Aflaq had written earlier that communism 
was a product of abstract eighteenth century philosophy and 
that its practise in Russia seems to be the product of 
Russian spiritualism and scientific European thought. To 
him, communism had no semblance to any Arab intellectual 
traditions or to the past and present life of the Arabs. 
The insistence of the Ba'th on differentiating its 
socialism from Marxist Scientific socialism has led to 
the coining of the term "Arab socialism", not as a 
derivative of Marxism but as an opposing and contra-
dictory ideology. Besides, both Aflaq and Bitar believed 
that Marxism greatly exaggerated the importanc • of class 
struggle, ignoring the vital historical role of 
33 
national ism. 
Changes in Ba'thist attitudes regarding socialism 
began to appear in the mid-1950s. Jamal Attasi, writing 
in 1956, repeated the party's oft-stated differences 
between communism and Ba'thism, but noted that Ba'thists 
could learn a good deal from the manner in which socialism 
had been put into practice in the socialist countries. 
Attasi said in a companion article for example, "Socialism 
can not realize its goals unless it starts from the 
33. Op. cit., Ismail, Tariq Y; p. 44. See also 
Aflaq Michael; "The Socialist Ideology of 
the Ba'th"; Karpat, Kemal H (ed.); Politi-
cal and social Thought in Contemporary 
Middle East, America, (1982) , pp^ 14TJ-145. 
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(fact of) division, differences and conflict among 
society's structures and classes". 
Munif Razzaz an early member of the party in 
Jordan was equally forthright in his article entitled "Why 
socialism now? "takes a very different approach to 
socialism than Aflaq did. 
To him, "Socialism is a way of life, not just an 
economic order. It extends to all aspects of life-
economic, politics, training, education, social life, 
health, moral, literature, science, history, and others, 
both great and small." 
Digressing from the established practice of 
placing nationalism above every thing else, he sought to 
demonstrate that socialism, freedom and unity were inter-
related and interdependent. 
It was in this context that the party's Sixth 
National Congree in 1963 reviewed the Ba'th's outlook on 
socialism - focussing on its positive as well as negative 
aspects. While nothing that in the early stage the 
Ba'th's concept of socialism was not clear and well 
defined, it maintained that this deficiency was partly 
34. Op. cit., Devlin John F; pp. 36-37. 
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compensated by the party's revolutionary stand point in 
struggle which indeed saved it from being submerged in 
bourgeois reformism. 
In the new formulation, socialism aims at the 
establishment of a new social order in which objective 
economic, social, intellectual, and political conditions 
are established that free the individual from all forms of 
exploitation, subjugation, and stagnation and allow him 
to become a completely free human being. This new 
conception of socialism which the sixth National 
Conference had approved however was soon attacked by both 
rightist and leftist elements within the Ba'th. The 
former discredited it as being extremist and the latter 
condemned it as being selective and not sufficiently 
A- 1 36 radical . 
Nevertheless to achieve its two-fold objective of 
comprehensive Arab unity and socialism, the Ba'th 
commends the course of revolution and struggle. The 
driving force behind this revolution is the concept of the 
"Arab Mission" embodied in the Ba'th's battle cry; one 
37 Arab nation with an immoral mission. 
35. For detail see Appendix - B; Decisions of the 
sixth National Convention of the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party, 1963. 
36. Op. cit., Ismail, Tariq, Y; p. 45. 
37. Op. cit.. Engineer Asgher Ali; p. 44. 
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The Arab nationalist doctrine dictated by Michael 
Aflaq had at its heart a call for a revitalization of Arab 
society. This was the essence of the sacred mission of 
the party and was what Aflaq intended to convey when he 
used the word tnqllab. Thus In a talk given to a party 
branch in February 1950, he said: 
"Revolution then, before being a political and 
social program, is that prime propelling power, that 
powerful psychic current, that mandatory struggle, without 
which the re-awakening of the nation is not to be under-
stood."^^ 
Thus, to Aflaq 'Inqilab' means changing people 
rather than the system. Once the people, or enough of 
them had undergone an interior transformation, 
"liberating the intellect... and releasing the source of 
faith in the soul." Change in the system would follow 
on 
automatically. This interpretation of 'Inqilab' as 
transformation came to have considerable influence in the 
Ba'th Party in the forties and early fifties. As article 
6 of the Ba'th Constitution states; "The party of the 
Arab Ba'th is revolutionary. It believes that its main 
objectives for the realization of the renaissance of Arab 
nationalism or for the establishment of socialism can not 
38. Aflaq, Michael; "Nationalism and Revolution", 
Haim, Sylvia G (ed.); Arab Nationalism: An 
Anthology, University of California Press, 
Los Angles and London, (1962), p. 245. 
39. Op, cit., Devlin, John F; pp. 26-27. 
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be achieved except by means of revolution and struggle. 
To rely on slow evolution and to be satisfied with a 
partial and superficial reforms is to threaten these aims 
40 
and to conduce to their failure and their loss." 
Aflaq laid down three essential conditions for the 
Inqilab. 
(1) Awareness of the historical and contemporary 
realities which called for drastic transformation; 
(2) a feeling of responsibility rooted in a strong moral 
base; and (3) a genuine belief in the feasibility, at 
the existing stage of Arab history, of the proposed 
Inqilab. 
These conditions were to be fulfilled by al-Talla 
(the vanguard) who constitutes the membership of the 
Ba'th. The struggle which designated as the practical 
expression of the Inqilab, wrote Aflaq, creates its own 
crusaders. The Inqilab becomes a living thing in their 
souls, minds and manners or it becomes life itself. Once 
achieved, the Inqilab would presumably usher in the 
Ba'thist trinity-unity, freedom, and socialism. Converse-
ly, the trinity are indispensable ingredients for the 
success of the Inqilab, since the Ideals of unity. 
40. Op. clt., Appendix - A; Constitution of the Arab 
Ba'th Socialist Party. 
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freedom and socialism are considered fundamental and 
41 inseparable objective of equal importance. 
Aflaq, as Sylvia Haim has put it, "Considers 
politics as a means of effecting a change of heart among 
the Arabs, infact of instituting the reign of love among 
them .... It is for this reason that he proclaims ... 
that 'Nationalism is love before everything else. It is 
only when the Arabs love one another, their nation, and 
their soil with an absolute and unquestioning love that 
they will find salvation, and that their weaknesses and 
difficulties will fall away from them. This uncompro-
mising vision of a superhuman and transformed life as the 
end of political action gives Aflaq a stature which other 
Arab nationalist writers do not possess." 
Aflaq's three objectives - national unity, 
freedom, and socialism - are, in his view, indissolubly 
fused; none can be fully achieved without the others; 
all depend on the people and on faith in their eternal 
regenerative powers. But all are, in turn, only means 
to the ultimate end of the mission of the Arab nation in 
the world.^^ 
41. Op. cit., IJMES, (3), 1972, p.5. 
42. Op. cit., Seale, Patrick; p. 155, 
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Aflaq's views - indeed, the Ba'th ideology as a 
whole - are stated in vague and abstract terms, acceptable 
in principle to young men imbued with idealism but never 
really spelt out as a party program. 'Aflaq may have 
been right in stating that he, as the party's philosopher, 
provided only general principles - a conceptual framework 
for the party's programme - and that it would be the duty 
of the party's leader to work out a detailed programme. 
CHAPTER - V 
NATIONALISM AND MICHAEL AFLAQ: AN ANTHOLOGY 
It has been suggested that the growth of Prag-
matism and idealism was the principal chracteristic of the 
Arab nationalist movement between the two world wars. 
Despite, articulate Arab opinion in this period found a 
constant source ot bitterness in the division and 
occupation of Arab territories by Britain and France. 
Imperialist machinations were blamed for the failure of a 
unified Arab nation to emerge from the Arab revolt. As a 
result, the inter-war Arab independence movements, 
whether particularist or broadly national, were couched in 
anti-western slogans. 
Indeed the central struggle was the one against 
the imperialist occupying forces, and the principal 
demands centred on the restoration of a formal 
sovereignty, on which basis the power of a national state 
enjoying real decision - making autho ity over significant 
domains could gradually be built up. It was a pragmatism 
98 
firmly rooted in the framework of orthodoxy, of the faith, 
the only ideology recognized as appropriate for the umma 
as a whole. Implicit or explicit debate was permitted, 
but it must never degenerate into a dialectical struggle 
which could lead to disunity. The goal was a restoration 
of past glory, by means of a reworking of the historical 
legacy in terms of the most urgent and inevitable 
requirements of modern times, rather than by progressive 
transformation of present realities. The factors 
influencing this overall social plarization were by no 
means confined to a national framework. The process 
unfolded in different ways in each Arab country: 
according to the evolution of economic structures, the 
nature of the political regime, the depth of 
colonial penetration, the degree of genuine independence, 
the quality of national culture and the role of the 
popular classes, amongst other factors. 
It was in this context that the Socialism of the 
Arab countries took on a national role and approach. Arab 
Socialists understood that only by being fully itself, 
rather than a mere imitator of others, can a nation become 
a full member of the International Community. 
In Syria to which the French had granted indepen-
dence in 1943, the rise of the Socialist Ba'th as a mass 
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political organization dates from the end of the war, and 
more specifically from the subsequent defeat of the Arab 
armies in Palestine in 1948.* 
There is much controversy among Ba'thists as to 
whether Zaki al-Arsuzi or Michael Aflaq and 
Salah al-Din al-Bitar were the real founders 
of the Ba'th. The answer to this question is 
academic because the Ba'th was an idea 
representing national aspirations long 
before it took the shape of a political 
party. Its origins go back to the Arab 
revolt of 1916 and Faysal's ill-fated 
attempt to unite greater Syria under the 
Hashemite crown. When the French forcibly 
expelled Faysal from Damascus, they also 
frustrated a generation of Syrian 
nationalist youth who for a fleeting moment 
stood up for liberation and unification. 
During the inter-war period, Pan-Arab 
Patriots agonized over their plight under 
the Mandate and nourished visions of 
'resurrecting' the ancient glories of the 
Umayyads. In a more immediate sense the 
Ba'th Party can be considered as successor 
to the League of National Action (Usbat 
al-Amal al-Qawmi) which was organized in 
1932 to spearhead the struggle against the 
French, and remained politically active 
until 1940. 
For the Syrian nationalists the war 
years were trying, filled with soul-
searching and sporadic attempts to escape 
from political emptiness. In 1939 an Arab 
national party was apparently founded by 
Al-Arsuzi and a handful of followers, but it 
lasted for only a few months. At the end 
of November 1940 al-Arsuzi, with only five 
of his disciples, organized another party, 
al-Ba'th al-'Arabi (The Arab Resurrection). 
Sami al-Jundi, a founding member of that 
diminutive group, records how he and al-
Arsuzi incidently learned of the existence 
of another, very similar, party which called 
Contd 
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Those years corresponded to Syria's gaining of 
independence and its attempt to devise for itself a new 
role and a new identity within the Arab world. The 
nationalist currents that had developed in syria since the 
turn of the century made it clear that Syria would become 
a fountainhead of the Arab renaissance and a natural 
leader in future developments. 
As this study has indicated, the attempts to 
reformulate old or to establish new bases on which 
personal loyalty and identity could focus, constituted a 
prolonged and controversial debate in modern Arab 
history. Aflaq, as his published works and his personal 
career indicate, was deeply involved in this debate, 
first as a Syrian and later as an advocate of Arab 
nationalism. Throughout his career, Aflaq was able to 
select and utilize those doctrines which he felt were 
best suited to specific circumstances. Aflaq, for his 
part, approaches the problem of Western influence from 
itself al-Ihya al-Arabi and alternatively 
al-Ba'th al-Arabi. Its leaders were 
Michael Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, and 
all the members of the two Ba'th, with one 
or two exceptions, were their students at 
the Tajhiz Dimashq high school. Al-Arsuzi's 
Ba'th eventually disbanded, and its members 
joined al-Ihya al-Arabi, which became a 
vocal protagonist of Arab unity and 
socialism in the country. 
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two interrelated view points. On the one hand, he does 
not hesitate to identify the imperialists as enemies of 
Arabism and their ambitions as the principal cause for the 
division of the Arab nation into separate states following 
World War I. 
On another level, however, Aflaq's anti-
imperialist statements form a vital rational ingredient 
for his overall theories on language and history; for, in 
order to sustain the argument that the Arab nation is a 
natural entity, he must show that intrusive rather than 
inherent factors have denied that nation its rightful 
unity. Thus, while he often criticizes Western actions 
towards the Arabs, his discussions are usually presented 
in terms of carefully constructed historical arguments 
which seldom lose themselves in vituperative rhetoric. 
And his conclusions are always the same: there are no 
fundamental differences among the Arabs which require that 
they be devided into separate states. His attention in 
this regard is focused primarily on the Eastern Arab 
States of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine which 
were carved out of the former Ottoman provinces. 
Aflaq's manner approaching this subject seldom 
varies. He traces, often in great detail, the diplomatic 
policies of the Great powers in the years immediately 
preceding and following the first world war. He then 
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explains that those policies rather than historical or 
linguistic differences among the Arabs themselves have 
caused the division of the Arab nation. 
Michael Aflaq's doctrines, as such his work 
represents one of the first and most consistent attempts 
to explore the basis for modern secular nationhood among 
the Arabs. His principal contribution is the eloquent 
presentation of an alternative to regionalism and Islam as 
the basis for personal loyalty and identification. In his 
articulation of this alternative, he emphasizes language 
and history as the essential components of the nation, as 
the ties which bind particular groups of individuals to 
each other. All who speak Arabic, regardless of their 
race or religion, are included in this nation. Aflaq also 
utilizes what he believes to be the motive power of 
history, explaining to the Arabs that they are a nation 
with a positive future justified by a brilliant past. 
All that is needed is for the Arabs to recognize that they 
do, in fact, share a common language and history and thus 
constitutes a nation which ought to be unified. The 
virtues of sacrifice and communal solidarity are extolled 
as crucial attitudes for the inauguration of this 
national awakening and the sustenance of a modern nation. 
This emphasis on communal solidarity distinguish him from 
his contemporaries. Therefore, instead of demonstrating 
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a lack of appreciation for the individual in general, he 
represents a sincere intellectual effort on his part to 
accommodate the demands of the Arab situation as he saw 
it. It is a natural result of his own Commitment to 
Arabism; he espouses those principles, which he feels 
will best serve the cause of Arab unity and, for this 
purpose, the Arabs require a new sense of communal 
commitment rather than emphasis on an individualism which 
he regards as already too widespread. Within the context 
of the ideology he has chosen, the final object of 
personal identification and loyalty is the Arab nation, 
the proper sentiments are nationalism and patriotism, the 
required duties are solidarity and sacrifice, the ultimate 
objective is unity, and the grand symbol is Arabism. He 
believes that nationalist ideologues have played roles of 
crucial importance in establishing the national conscious-
ness which led to unity in other nations. He further 
feels that if a similar national awareness can be spread 
among the Arabs, then the course of their unification will 
parallel that of other nations according to the action of 
historical forces. 
As a West Asian Christian Arab Scholar, Af 1 aq 
expounded for nearly half a century a doctrine of secular 
pan-Arab nationalism based largely on an interpretation of 
European history. He countered the diverse and opposing 
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solutions which emerged from the first world war with a 
clear, uncompromising ideology. Despite the complexities 
involved in his adoption of Arab nationalism, he never 
wavered in his belief that his Ba'thist ideology was the 
only one to which the Arabs could adhere if they wished to 
achieve the unification from which strength and dignity 
would ensure. He offered the dream of Arab unity, called 
for faith in the possibility and desirability of achieving 
that dream, and attempted to inculcate the values needed 
to give it reality. "Nationalism is love before every-
thing else", was truly his message. 
Aflaq resided in Iraq till his death in 1989. 
To conclude, there seems to be an element of 
adventurism in Aflaq, but this is not necessarily the 
product of political opportunism or lack of honesty; it 
is perhaps a function of the revolutionary principle which 
he deemed necessary to achieve goals. Basically he was a 
visionary and a romantic type of intellectual politicians 
which is not out of place in society. 
Today, to be sure the Ba'thist remain, but their 
messianlsm is far less in evidence. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
B O O K S 
Abdel-Malek, Anour: (ed) Contemporary Arab Political 
Thought. Zed' Books London, 1980, 
Abu Jaber, Kamel S; The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, 
History, Ideology and Organization, Syracuse, New 
Y^rk, 1966. 
Aflaq, Michael; Remembering the Arabian Prophet Beirut, 
Arab Organization for Studies and Publications, 
1975. 
; Pa'th and Heritage, A Collection of Speeches by 
Michael Aflaq, Rajendra Ravindra Printers (Pvt) 
Ltd., Ram Nagar, Delhi, 1976. 
Ajami, Fouad; The Arab Predicament: Arab Political 
Thought and Practice Since 1967, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1981. 
Allen Richard; Imperialism and Nationalism in the Fertile 
Crescent: Scources and Prospects of the Arab 
Israeli Conflict, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1974. 
Amin, Samir; The Arab Nation, Nationalism and Class 
Struggle, Zed Press, London, 1980. 
Antonious, George; Arab Awakening: The Story of Arab 
National Movement, Coproeom Books, New York, 1965. 
Berindranath, Dewan; Iraq, The Land of Arab Resurgence, 
India, 1979. 
Borthwick, B.M; Comparative Politics of Middle East: An 
Introduction, New Jersey, America, 1980. 
106 
Cantori, Louis, J. and Iliya Harik (ed.) Local Politics 
and Development in the Middle East, West View 
Press, Inc. America, 1934. 
CARDRI Committee and Repression and for Democratic Rights 
in Iraq: Saddam's Iraq, Revolution or Reaction? 
Zed Books Ltd, 1986. 
Curtis, Michael; Religion and Politics in the Middle East, 
Westview Press/boulder Colorado, 1981. 
Dawn, C. Ernest; From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the 
Origins of Arab Nationalism, Illinois Press, 
London, 1973. 
Davis Uri, Andrew Mack, Nirayuval-Davis (ed.) Israel and 
the Palestinians, Ithaca Press, London, 1975. 
Devlin, John F; The Ba'th Party, A History from its 
Origin to 19661 Stanford University Press, 
California, 1976. 
Engineer, Asghar Ali (ed) Islam and Revolution, Ajanta 
Delhi, 1984. 
Fisher, Sydney, N; The Middle East a History, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London, 1959. 
Goldschmidt, Arthur; Concise History of the Middle East, 
Third Edition, VJestview Press, Boulder and London, 
(1979). 
Haddad, George; Revolutions and Military Rule in the 
Middle East; The Arab States, Robert Speller and 
Sens, New York, 1965. 
Halm, Sylvia G. (ed); Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, 
Los Angeles and London, 1962, paperback edition 
1976. 
Harari, Maurice; Government and Politics of the Middle 
East, Prentice Hall, Inc. 1962. 
Hitti, P.K; Hist ory of the Arabs, 10th *^^  • London, 
Macmillan, 1986. 
Hopwood, Dereb (ed.) Syria 1945-1986: Politics and 
Society, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988. 
107 
Hourani, Albert H; Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 
1798-1939, Oxford University Press, London, 19b2. 
Hudson, Michael C; Arab Politics: The Search for Legiti-
macy, Yale University Press London, 1977. 
Ismail, Tariq Y; The Arab Left, Syracuse University Press, 
America, 1976. 
karpat, Kemal, H. (ed.) Political and Social Thought in 
Contemporary Middle East, Pall Mall Press7 London, 
1968. 
Kazzeha, W.W; Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab 
World, Charles Knight, London, 1975. 
Kerr, Malcolm; The Arab Cold War, 1958-64: A Study of 
Ideology in Politics, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1965. 
Khadduri, Majid; Independent Iraq 1932-1958, 2nd Edition, 
Oxford 196ir 
, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since 
the Revolution of 1958, Oxford, 1969. 
, Political Trends in the Arab World, The Johns 
Hopkins Press, Bultimore and London, 1970. 
, Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in 
Politics, Johns Hopkins University Press, Balti-
more, 1973. 
, Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since 
1968 (The Middle East Institute, Washington, t).C. 
vm). 
Kim Ball, Lorezo, K; The Changing Pattern of Political 
Power in Iraq 1958 to 1971, Robert Speller an^ 
Sons Publishers, New York, 1972. 
Kirk, George E; A Short History of the Middle East, 
Surjeet Publications, Delhi, 1981. 
Laroui, Abadllah, The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: 
Traditionalism or HistoricislTj University of 
California Press, 1974. 
108 
lawless, Richard, Middle East in the Twentieth Century, 
Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd., London, 
1980. 
Lenezowski, George (ed.) Political Elites in the Middle 
East, American Enterprize Institute For Public 
Policy Research Washington, D.C. 1975 
Lewis, Bernard; The Middle East and the West, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, London, 1963. 
Marlowe, John; Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, 
Praeger, New York, 1961. 
Meghny, Said Abdel; Arab Socialism, London, 1972. 
Nuseibeh. Hazem Zaki; The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, 
(IThaca N.Y.) 1956, rept. part Washington, 1972. 
Rabinovich, Itamar; Syria Under the Ba'th 1963-66: The 
y Symbiosii 
Jerusalam, 1972. 
Army Part s"^  Israel University Press, 
A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Nationalism, 
Frankcase and Co. Ltd., 1963. 
Roberts, David; The Ba'th and the Creation of Modern 
Syria, Croom Helm, London, 1987. 
Rodenson, Maxime; Marxism and the Muslim World, Zed 
Press, London, 1979. 
, The Arabs, Croom Helm, London, 1981. 
Salame Ghassan; The Foundation of the Arab States, Croom 
Helm, London, 1987. 
Sands, William (ed.) The Arab Nation, Middle East 
Institute, Washington, 1961. 
Seale, Patrick; The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post 
War Arab Politics, 1945-58; I.B. Touris^& Co. 
Ltd., London, 1965. 
Sluglett, Marion Farouk and Peter Sluglett; Iraq Since 
1958, From Revolution to Dictatorship KPI, London, 
TMT! — ^ 
109 
Smith, Anthony D; Theories of Nationalism; Duckworth 
London, 1971. 
Sharabi, Hisham; Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab 
World (The Middle East and North Africa), London, 
, Arabs Intellectual and the West, Johns Hopkins 
Press, Baltimore, 1970. 
Tachau, Frank (ed.) Political Elites and Political Devel-
opment in the Middle East, Schenkman Publishing 
Company, Inc. Cambridge, 1975. 
Trevelyan, Humphrey; The Middle East in Revolution, Mac-
million, London, 1970. 
Tutsch, Hans E; Facets of Arab Nationalism, Wayne State 
University Press, Detriot, 1965. 
Vatikiotis, P.J; Conflict in the Middle East, Aldine 
Altherton, U.K., 1971. 
Zeini, Zeini N; Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence 
of Arab Nationalism, Beirut, 1958. 
A R T I C L E S 
Abu Khalil As'ad, "A New Arab Ideology: The Rejuvenation 
of Arab Nationalism, Middle East Journal, Vol.46, 
No.l, Winter, 1992. 
Baram, Amazia, "Qawmiyya and Wataniyya in Ba'thi Iraq: 
The Search for a New Balance", Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, April 198T: 
, "The Ruling Political Elite in Ba'thi Iraq, 1968-
1966: The Changing Features of Collective 
Profile", International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, November 1989" 
Baram Amatzia, Mescpotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq, 
Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 19, October 1983, 
November 4. 
110 
, "Ba'thi Iraq and Hashmite Jordan: From Hostility 
to Alignment", Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, 
No.45, No.l, Winter 1991. 
Batatu, Hanna, "Iraq's Underground Shi'a Movement Charac-
teristics, Causes and Prospects, "Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 35, No. 4, Autumn, 1981. 
Bengio-Ofra, "Shi'is and Politics in Ba'thi Iraq", 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No.l, January 
Drysdale, Alasdair; "The Syrian Political Elite, 1966-
1976: A Spatial and Social Analysis", Middle 
Eastern Studies. Vol. 17, No. 2, January 1981. 
Hasan, S. Shamir, "The Palestinians and the Gulf War", 
Vol. 4, No. 1 & 2, Strategic Studies Journal, 
1992. 
Kalyani, Nabil M; The rise of the Syrian Ba'th, 1940-58, 
Political Success, Failure, International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, 1972. 
Nasser, Munir H; "Iraq; Ethnic Minorities and Their 
Impact on Politics", Journal of South Asian and 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No.3, Spring 1985. 
Olmet, Yosef, "Domestic Crisis and Foreign Policy in 
Syria, The Asad Regime", Middle East Review, Vol. 
20, No. 3, Spring 1988. 
Porath, Yehoshua, Nuri al-Sa'id's Arab Unity Programme", 
Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 20, No. 4, October, 
1934. 
Reiser, Stewart, Pan-Rabism Revisited, Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1983. 
Roy Delwin & Naff, Thomas; "Ba'thist Ideology, Economic 
Development and Educational Strategy", Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4, October 1989. 
Pringborg, Robert, "Ba'thism in Practice: Agriculture, 
Politics and Culture in Syria and Iraq", Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, April 1981^ 
I l l 
Van Dusen Michael H; "Politiclal Integration and 
Regionalism in Syria", Middle East Journal, Vol. 
26, 2 (1972) 
Yahya, Mohd; "A Criticism of Arab Nationalism", Vol. 3, 
No.2, Al-Tawhid, January-March, 1986. 
r***:Sr«r*«r 
A P P E N D I X - A 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
First Principle: Unity and Freedom of the Arab Nation 
The Arabs form one nation: This nation has the 
natural right to live in a single state and to be free to 
direct its own dostiny. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th therefore believes 
that: 
(1) The Arab fatherland constitutes an indivisible 
political and economic unity. No Arab country can live 
apart from the others. 
(2) The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any 
differences existing among its sons are accidental and 
unimportant. They will all disappear with the awakening of 
the Arab consciousness. 
(3) The Arab fatherland belongs to the Arabs. They 
alone have the right to administer its affairs, to dispose 
of its wealth, and to direct its destinies. 
ii 
Second Principle: Personality of the Arab Nation 
The Arab nation is characterized by virtues which 
are the result of its successive rebirths. These virtues 
are characterized by vitality and creativeness and by an 
ability for transformation and renewal. Its renewal is 
always linked to growth in personal freedom, and harmony 
between its evolution and the national interest. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th therefore believes 
that: 
(1) Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of 
belief, as well as artistic freedom, are sacred. No 
authority can diminish them. 
(2) Tha value of the citizens is measured - once all 
opportunities have been given them - by the action they 
take to further the progress and prosperity of the Arab 
nation, without regard to any other criterion. 
Third Principle: The Mission of the Arab Nation 
The Arab nation has an eternal mission. This 
mission reveals itself in ever new and related forms 
through the different stages of history. It aims at the 
renewal of human values, at the quickening of human 





The Party of the Arab Ba'th therefore believes 
that: 
(1) Colonialism and all that goes with it is a criminal 
enterprise. The Arabs must fight it with all possible 
means, just as they must take it on themselves to help, 
according to their physical and moral abilities, all 
peoples fighting for their freedom.' 
(2) Humanity constitutes a whole, the interests of 
which are solidarity and the values and civilization of 
which are common to all. The Arabs are enriched by world 
civilization and enrich it in their turn. They stretch 
fraternal hand to other nations and collaborate with the 
for the establishment of just institutions which will 
ensure for all the peoples prosperity and peace, as well as 
moral and spiritual advance. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Article 1. The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a universal 
Arab party. It has branches in all the Arab countries. 
It does noc concern itself with regional politics except 
in relation to the higher interests of the Arab cause. 
Article 2. The headquarters of the party is for the time 
being located in Damascus. It can be transferred to any 
other Arab city if the national interest should require it. 
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Article 3. The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a national 
party. It believes that nationalism is a living and 
eternal reality. It believes that the feeling of national 
awakening which intimately unites the individual to his 
nation is a sacred feeling. This feeling has within itself 
a potential of creative power; it binds itself to 
sacrifice, it seeks the exercise of responsibilities, and 
it directs the individual personality in a concrete and 
active manner. 
The national idea to which the party appeals is the 
will of the Arab people to free themselves and to unite. 
It demands that the opportunity be given to it to realize 
in history its Arab personality, and to collaborate with 
all the nations in all the fields which will ensure the 
march of humanity towards welfare and progress. 
Article 4. The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a Socialist 
party. Ic believes that socialism is a necessity which 
emanates from the depth of Arab nationalism itself. 
Socialism constitutes, in fact, the ideal social order 
which will allow the Arab people to realize its 
possibilities and to enable its genius to flourish, and 
which will ensure for the nation constant progress in its 
material and moral output. It makes possible a trustful 
brotherhood among its members. 
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Article 5. The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a popular 
party. It believes that sovereignty is the property of the 
people, who alone is the source of all authority. It 
believes that the value of the state is the outcome of the 
will of the masses from which it issues and that this value 
is sacred only to the extent that the masses have exercised 
their choice freely. That is why, in the accomplishment 
of its mission, the party relies on the people with whom 
it seeks to establish intricate contact, the spiritual, 
moral, material, and physical level of whom it is trying to 
raise, in order that the people may become conscious of its 
personality and that it may become able to exercise its 
right in private and public life. 
Article 6. The Party of the Arab Ba'th is revolutionary. 
It believes that its main objectives for the realization of 
the renaissance of Arab nationalism or for the 
establishment of socialism cannot be achieved except by 
means of revolution and struggle. To rely on slow 
evolution and to be satisfied with a partial and 
superficial reform is to threaten these aims and to conduce 
to their failure and their loss. 
This is why the party decides in favor of: 
(1) The struggle against foreign colonialism, in order 
to liberate the Arab fatherland completely and finally. 
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(2) The struggle to gather all the Arabs in a single 
independent state. 
(3) The overthrow of the present faulty structure - an 
overthrow which will include all the sectors of 
intellectual, economic, social, and political life. 
Article 7. The Arab fatherland is that part of the globe 
inhabited by the Arab nation which stretches from the 
Taurus Mountain, the Pocht-i-Kouh Mountains, the Gulf of 
Basra, the Arab Ocean, the Ethiopian Mountains, the Sahara, 
the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean. 
Article 8. The official language of the state, as well as 
that of all the citizens, is Arabic. It alone is 
recognized in correspondence and in teaching. 
Article 9. The emblem of the Arab state is that of the 
Arab revolution begun in 1916 to liberate and unify the 
Arab nation. 
Article 10. An Arab is he whose language is Arabic, who 
has lived on Arab soil, or who, after having been 
assimilated to Arab life, has faith in his belonging to the 
Arab nation. 
Article 11. To be excluded from the Arab fatherland: 
whoever has fought for or has belonged to a factious anti-
Arab association, whoever has lent himself inside the Arab 
fatherland to colonial ends. 
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Article 12. The Arab woman enjoys all the rights of 
citizenship. The party struggles to raise up woman's level 
in order to make her fit to exercise these rights. 
Article 13. The party strives to give all the citizens 
the same opportunities in the field of schooling and 
livelihood in order that, in the various aspects of human 
activity, everyone should be equally able to show his real 
abilities and to develop them to the maximum. 
INTERNAL POLICY OF THE PARTY 
Article lA. The regime of the Arab state will be a 
constitutional parliamentary regime. Executive power is 
responsible before the legislative, which is directly 
elected by the people. 
Article 15. The national tie is the only tie that may 
exist in the Arab state. It ensures harmony among all the 
citizens by melting them in the crucible of a single nation 
and counteracts all religious, communal, tribal, racial, or 
regional factions. 
Article 16. The administrative system of the Arab state 
is a system of decentralization. 
Article 17. The party strives to make popular feeling 
universal and to make the power of the people a living 
reality in the life of the individual. It undertakes to 
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give the state a constitution guaranteeing to all Arab 
citizens absolute equality before the law, the right to 
express tlieir opinions in absolute freedom, and a true 
choice of their representatives, thus ensuring for them a 
free life within the framework of the law. 
Article 18. A single code of laws is to be established 
freely for the whole of the Arab nation. This code will be 
in conformity with the spirit of the times and will take 
into account the past experiences of the Arab nation. 
Article 19. The judicial power will be independent. It 
will be free from inference by other powers and enjoy total 
immunity. 
Article 20. The rights of citizenship are granted in 
their totality to every citizen living on Arab soil who is 
devoted to the Arab fatherland and who has no connection 
with any factious association. 
Article 21. Military service is compulsory in the Arab 
fatherland. 
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PARTY 
Article 22. The foreign policy of the Arab state will be 
guided by the interests of Arab nationalism and of the 
eternal mission of the Arabs which seeks to establish in 
cooperation with other nations a free, harmonious, and 
secure world, continuously advancing in progress. 
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Article 23. The Arabs will struggle with all their power 
to destroy the foundations of colonialism and of foreign 
occupation and to suppress all foreign political or 
economic influence in their country. 
Article 24. Since the Arab people is the sole source of 
power, all treaties, pacts, and documents concluded by 
governments which detract from the total sovereignty of the 
Arabs will be abrogated. 
Article 25. Arab foreign policy seeks to give a true 
picture of the will of the Arabs to live in freedom, and of 
their sincere desire to see all other nations enjoy the 
same liberty. 
ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE PARTY 
Article 26. The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a Socialist 
party. It believes that the economic wealth of the 
fatherland belongs to the nation. 
Article 27. The present distribution of wealth in the 
Arab fatherland is unjust. Therefore a review and a just 
redistribution will become necessary. 
Article 28. The equality of all the citizens is founded 
on human values. This is why the party forbids the 
exploitation of the work of others. 
Article 29. Public utilities, extensive natural 
resources, big industry, and the means of transport are the 
property of the nation. The state will manage them 
directly and will abolish private companies and foreign 
concessions. 
Article 30. Ownership of agricultural land will be so 
limited as to be in proportion to the means of the 
proprietor to exploit all his lands without exploitation of 
the efforts of others. This will be under the control of 
the state and in conformity with its over-all economic 
plan. 
Article 31. Small industrial ownership will be so limited 
as to be related to the standard of living of the citizens 
of the state as a whole. 
Article 32. Workers will participate in the management of 
their factory. In addition to their wages - fixed by the 
state - they will receive a proportion of the profits, also 
fixed by the state. 
Article 33. Ownership of immovable property is allowed to 
all the citizens so long as they do not exploit it to the 
harm of others, and so long as the state ensures for all 
citizens a minimum of immovable property. 
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Article 34. Property and inheritance are two natural 
rights. They are protected within the limits of the 
national interest. 
Article 35. Usurious loans are prohibited between 
citizens. One state bank is to be founded to issue 
currency, which the national output will back. This bank 
will finance the vital agricultural and industrial plans of 
the nation. 
Article 36. The state will control directly internal and 
external trade in order to abolish the exploitation of the 
consumer by the producer. The state will protect them 
both, as it will protect the national output against the 
competition of foreign foods and will ensure equilibrium 
between exports and imports. 
Article 37. General planning, inspired by the most modern 
economic ideas, will be organized so that the Arab 
fatherland will be industrialized, national production 
developed, new outlets opened for it, and the industrial 
economy of each region directed according to its potential 
and to the raw material it contains. 
SOCIAL POLICY OF THE PARTY 
Article 38. Family, Procreation, Marriage. 
(1) The family is the basic cell of the nation. It is 
for the state to protect, to develop, and to help it. 
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(2) Procreation is a trust given in the first place to 
Che family, and then to the state. Both must ensure its 
increase, and look to the health and education of the 
descendants. 
(3) Marriage is a national duty. The state must 
encourage it, facilitate it, and control It. 
Article 39. Public Health. The state will build, at its 
expense, institutions of preventive medicine, dispensaries, 
and hospitals which will meet the needs of all citizens, 
for whom the state ensures free medical treatment. 
Article 40. Labour. 
(1) labor is an obligation for all those who are 
capable of it. It is for the state to ensure that work is 
available to every citizen, whether intellectual or 
mannual. 
(2) The employer must ensure at the least a decent 
standard of living for his employee. 
(3) The state sees to the maintenance of all persons 
incapable of work. 
(4) Just laws will be promulgated to limit the 
workman's daily hours of work, to give him the right to 
paid weekly and annual holidays, to protect his rights, to 
ensure social security for him in old age, and to indemnify 
him for any cessation of work, whether partial or total. 
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(5) Free workmen's and peasants' unions will be 
established and encouraged, so that they may constitute an 
instrument efficient in the defense of their rights, in 
raising their standard of living, in developing their 
abilities, in increasing the opportunities offered to 
them, in creating among them a spirit of solidarity, and in 
representing them in joint works councils. 
(6) Joint works councils will be created in which the 
state and the unions of workmen and peasants will be 
represented. These councils will have power to decide the 
issues arising among the unions, the works managers, and 
the representatives of the state. 
Article 41. Culture and Society. 
(1) The party seeks to develop a general national 
culture for the whole Arab fatherland which shall be Arab, 
liberal, progressive, extensive, profound, and humanist; 
it attempts to disseminate it in all sections of the 
population. 
(2) Th3 state is responsible for the protection of the 
liberty of speech, of publication, of assembly, of protest, 
and of thvi press, within the limits of the higher Arab 
national interest. It is for the state to facilitate all 
the means and the modalities which tend to realize this 
liberty. 
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(3) Intellectual work is one of the most sacred kinds. 
It is the state's concern to protect and encourage 
intellectuals and scientists. 
(4) Within the limits of the Arab national idea, every 
freedom will be given for the foundation of clubs, 
associations, parties, youth groupings, and tourist 
organizations, as well as for obtaining profit from the 
cinema, radio, television, and all the other facilities of 
modern civilization in order to spread generally the 
national culture, and to contribute to the entertainment of 
the people. 
Article 42. Separation of the classes and differentia-
tion among them are abolished. The separation of the 
classes is the consequence of a faulty social order. 
Therefore, the party carries on its struggle among the 
laboring and oppreasecJ eJasnea of society so that such 
separation and differentiation will come to an end and the 
citizens will recover the whole of their human dignity 
and will be enabled to live in the shadow of a just social 
order in which nothing will distinguish one citizen from 
another except intellectual capacity and manual skill. 
Article 43. Nomadism. Nomadism is a promitive social 
state. It decreases the national output and makes an 
important part of the nation a paralyzed member and an 
XV 
obstacle to its development and progress. The party 
struggles for the sedentarlzation of nomads by the grant of 
lands to them, for the abolition of tribal customs, and for 
the application to the nomads of the laws of the state. 
POLICY OF THE PARTY IN EDUCATION AND TEACHING 
The educational policy of the party aims at the 
creation of a new Arab generation which believes in the 
unity of the nation, and in the eternity of its mission. 
The policy, based on scientific reasoning, will be freed 
from the shackles of superstitions and reactionary 
traditions; it will be imbued with the spirit of optimism, 
of struggle, and of solidarity among all citizens in the 
carrying out of a total Arab revolution, and in the cause 
of human progress. 
Therefore the party decides as follows: 
Article 4^. A national Arab stamp will mark all the 
aspects of intellectual, economic, political, architec-
tural, and artistic life. The party establishes once again 
the links of the Arab nation with its glorious history 
and urges it toward a future even more glorious and more 
exemplary. 
Article 45. Teaching is one of the exclusive functions 
of the state. Therefore, all foreign and private 
XVI 
educational institutions are abolished. 
Article 46. Education at all stages shall be free for all 
citizens. Primary and Secondary education shall be 
compulsory. 
Article 47. Professional schools with the most modern 
equipment shall be established, where education shall be 
free. 
Article 48. Teaching careers and all that relates to 
education are set aside for Arab citizens. An exception to 
this rule is made in the instance of higher education. 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Single Article. The fundamental and general principles of 
the Constitution cannot be amended. Other articles may, 
however, be amended, provided that two-thirds of the 
General Council of the party agree thereto, on a motion 
put by the Executive Council, or by a quarter of the 
members of the General Council, or by ten members of the 
Party Organization. 
APPENDIX - B 
DECISIONS OF THE SIXTH NATIONAL CONVENTION 
OF THE ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY, 1963 
INTRODUCTION 
Following are the general decisions of the Sixth National 
Convention of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: 
The struggle of the Arab Ba'th Socialist party has 
been continuous for approximately twnety years. During 
this period the people, led by the party, have offered 
many martyrs at the altar of the struggle for Arab national 
unity, liberty, and socialism. The Arab Ba'th Socialist 
party was able to outline the course of the Arab struggle 
with precision and understanding. It was able to 
crystallize the desires and goals of the Arab peoples in 
two spheres: the national sphere and the Socialist sphere. 
Furthermore, the party was able, during the negative 
aspects of the struggle, to incarnate the Arab peoples' 
ambitions and their revulsion toward the underdeveloped, 
exploited, and dismembered Arab present. 
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During twenty years of struggle the party has been 
able to incorporate itself truthfully in the struggle of 
the Arab peoples. It was able to lead successfully such 
struggles in Syria and Iraq; to deprive aristocracy, 
reactionaries, and the bourgeoisie of the leadership of 
Arab nationalism, to convert the nationalist movement into 
the momentum of the struggle of the millions. This party 
promises the Arab masses to walk, side by side with them 
unhesitatingly and untiringly in their nationalist struggle 
for Arab unity. 
The party has been able to bring into the Arab 
nationalist movement the spirit of the modern age. It has 
accomplished this by tying its interests to those of the 
struggling masses and by linking together the nationalist 
and Socialist revolutions. Today, the party promises the 
masses that it will continue to march with fortitude with 
the struggling masses to achieve the Socialist, revolution 
and to renew the slogans which it has carried and fought 
for since its inception. 
The party contributed toward creation of the first 
national revolutionary cadre for the Arabs in their modern 
history when it helped bring about the union of 1958 and 
sacrificed itself at the altar of that union. After the 
destruction of that union, the party was able to reorganize 
itself, lead the masses, and face courageously the 
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separatist regime that was an enemy of Arab nationalism and 
unity. This facilitated the downfall of the separatist 
reactionary regime in Damascus which had been exhausted by 
the attacks made by the Ba'th. On the morning of March 8, 
the vanguard of the Arab Ba'th Socialist party were leading 
forces to bury the black separatist regime. 
New circumstances have arisen that will facilitate 
great victories in the spheres of nationalism and 
socialism. The Cairo Covenant of April 17 [1963] was the 
product of the new circumstances brought about by the 
people's struggle led by the party. The Cairo authorities 
were not able to understand the new atmosphere of the Arab 
struggle, thus they refused to cooperate with the party 
and declared their withdrawal from the Covenant. 
Under these new circumstances the Sixth National 
Convention of the Arab Ba'th Socialist party was convened. 
On the threshold to positive struggle, the constructive 
struggle, the Sixth National Convention meets. It meets 
full of hope and determination to lead the new battle. 
It meets with the same faith in the Arab people and with 
cognizance of the historical responsibility placed upon 
it. 
The convention commenced its meetings on October 5, 
1963, and terminated on October 23, 1963. The Convention 
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discussed the party organization and direction of the 
authorities in the two Regions and studied some theoretical 
problems facing the Arab struggle; appropriate decisions 
were made. 
The Convention also discussed the political union 
of the two Regions -the Syrian and Iraqi-and the applica-
tion of Socialist measures. It made appropriate 
decisions. 
The Convention discussed Arab international 
political problems and made appropriate decisions. 
What follows are the principal decisions of the 
Convention. Full explanations of these decisions will be 
issued later. 
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE PARTY AND THE 
PARTY'S RELATION TO THE MASSES AND 
TO THE AUTHORITIES 
1. The Convention studied, in a general way, the 
organizational problems of the party and reaffirmed its 
principle of collective leadership in party activity; this, 
to reflect the democracy of the party at the top. 
The Convention concluded that the party's 
experience has confirmed the principle of democratic 
centralism in which it believes. The establishment of a 
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balance between centralism on the one hand and democracy on 
the other permits the free and responsible exercise of the 
party's struggle, and also preserves party unity while on 
the other hand realizing democracy. 
2. In a serious study of the party's situation in 
Syria and Iraq, the Convention paid particular attention 
to the forthcoming Socialist revolution. The Convention 
agreed that the social composition of the party would 
influence the Socialist revolution. Therefore, the 
Convention decided that the party's Socialist goals must be 
a reflection of its social composition since the Socialist 
revolution would rest on workers and peasants who must be 
at the base of the revolution and the party at the same 
time. 
3. In these circumstances where the party is in 
authority in both the Syrian and Iraqi Regions, the 
Convention warns against the infiltration of the party by 
opportunists, or the succumbing of some party elements to 
the temptations of power that will cause them to look down 
on the non-party masses. 
The Convention affirmed that membership in the 
party could only mean a tremendous responsibility to be 
borne by the member. Members should confine themselves to 
carrying out their responsibilities. Their rights are the 
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same as those accorded to any citizen without the addition 
of any privileges. 
The Convention agreed that the nonparty masses have 
the right to criticize and oversee party members. The 
Convention considers this supervision by the nonparty 
masses a natural right of the people that guarantees that 
process of rapport between the people and the party and 
between the party and the authorities. 
This popular supervision was considered a means to 
check against the temptations of power and a means to 
check against the rise of bourgeois tendencies within the 
party. 
The Convention emphasized that careful attention be 
paid to the behavior of prospective party members, that 
requirements for membership be made more stringent, and 
that the period of party training be lengthened to make 
certain of the prospective member's characteristics and 
readiness to struggle. 
4. Regarding the relation between the party and the 
state, the Convention decided upon the necessity of 
complete separation between the state and the party. It 
cautioned against the possibility of party involvement in 
the routine of day-to-day government. The Convention 
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considers the party as leader and director of the basic 
political problems of the state. 
The Convention recognized the necessity of having a 
larger proportion of party leadership devoted to the 
direction of party activity. 
DECISIONS CONCERNING SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS DEALING 
WITH THE PARTY IDEOLOGY AND THE ARAB NATIONAL STRUGGLE 
5. The Convention discussed a number of problems of 
the Arab struggle. It discussed some of the theoretical 
problems dealing with Arab unity, socialism, popular 
democracy, and the party's stand vis-a-vis international 
Socialist thought. The Convention recognized the two 
basic characteristics of the party's ideology, pragmatism 
and revolutionism, within the national framework. 
Tho Convention then criticized some of the out-
dated opinions and thoughts left behind as the party 
ideology advanced. Such criticism allows the ideological 
evolution of the party to meet future needs while main-
taining continuity with the party's heritage, in a manner 
that guarantees the ideological and organizational unity of 
the party and provides for revolutionary and scientific 
solutions to the problems of the Arab national struggle. 
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PROBLEMS OF THE SOCIALIST PROGRAM IN THE 
TWO REGIONS OF SYRIA AND IRAQ 
6. The Convention discussed the problems of conversion 
to a Socialist regime in the Regions of Syria and Iraq and 
decided to proceed with it on a democratic basis and with 
popular participation. Following a scientific discussion 
of the sociopolitical and class composition in the two 
Regions of Syria and Iraq, the Convention reiterated that 
the party should be based in the masses in preparation for 
the establishment of a revolutionary and democratic 
experiment in the two Regions that will influence the 
course of events in the entire Arab fatherland and provide 
the objective circumstances for interaction with other 
movements in the Arab fatherland. 
7. On the basis of a scientific analysis of economic 
and political conditions in the two Regions, the 
convention concluded that the bourgeoisie is unable to 
carry out any positive task in the economic sphere. 
Furthermore, the opportunism of the bourgeoisie qualifies 
it for the role of ally to the new colonialism. The 
workers, peasants, revolutionary civil and military 
intelligentsia, and the petit bourgeoisie were considered 
the proper forces for achievement of the Socialist 
revolution in its initial stage. 
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8. In an attempt to visualize the extent of Socialist 
evolution in the two Regions, and guided by Socialist 
experiments elsewhere in the world, the Convention asserted 
the necessity of democratic workers' participation in 
administration in the two Regions during the stage of state 
capitalism. 
The Convention cautioned against bureaucratic 
tendencies and stressed the necessity for a continual 
curbing and eventual liquidation of such tendencies. 
9. The Convention paid particular attention to the 
growth of governmental agencies and the relation of these 
to the party and the masses. 
The Convention approved a detailed policy of a 
revolutionary and democratic development of these agencies 
in a manner that would permit them to participate fully in 
the process of conversion to socialism. The Convention 
asserted that the principal task would be proper evolution 
rather than mutation. Evolution should be the basis, 
mutation the exception. Such a plan is necessitated by 
humane considerations and by a faith in the citizens' 
consciousness. 
As for the land problem, the Convention concluded 
with revolutionary and Socialist decisions. The Convention 
agreed on the necessity of take-off from a revolutionary 
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basis, and considered the agricultural revolution as a 
necessary step toward a quick economic development in the 
industrial sector. Thus the goal of establishing 
collective farms, administered by the peasants themselves, 
in those lands covered by agricultural reform, was 
considered the proper Socialist take-off point for the 
oncoming change in social relationships. Such a revolu-
tionary goal, coupled with peasant participation in the 
agricultural sphere, is a necessary element in the success 
of the Socialist revolution. 
10. The Convention also asserted the importance of 
Socialist planning in the regional and Arab spheres. 
Planning was considered the practical method by which all 
the national material, human, and natural resources could 
be scientifically and practically utilized. The Convention 
also emphasized industrialization and industrial develop-
ment. Investments should be centered in those more 
important spheres that guarantee real national economic 
development, rather than in those ostentatious accomplish-
ments that do not increase real production. 
11. The Conention laid out a Socialist policy in the 
field of social services. It drew attention to the 
apparent paradox between ostentatious and unnecessary 
spending in government and the low standard of living of 
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the masses. Austerity should be practiced by the well-to-
do and the government agencies as well. 
The Convention considered the problems of educa-
tion and the establishment of compulsory education. It 
stressed the need to eradicate illiteracy and to give the 
education of youth a scientific and national coloring that 
would go hand in hand with human knowledge. The education 
plan should correspond with the requirements of development 
and should stress higher specialization. It should look to 
an expansion of the scientific fields in the universities 
and to raising their standards. 
The Convention agreed on the necessity of expanding 
services in the rural areas and the poor and distant 
districts. Free and socialized medicine was considered 
the most basic aspect of Socialist thought. The Convention 
put forth the policy to execute this program beginning 
with expansion of medical school facilities and expansion 
of present government medical services until the eventual 
liquidation of private medicine. 
12. The Convention studied the National Guard Program. 
Despite some of the shortcomings and mistakes of this 
program it was considered a safeguard of the revolution. 
The Guard should be expanded and developed to become 
capable of fulfilling revolutionary tasks and educating 
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the masses. Any mistakes committed by members of the 
National Guard should be dealt with firmly. 
The Convention affirmed the right of popular 
organizations for workers, students, professionals, and 
women that are within the national Socialist line. It 
affirmed the associations' relative autonomy with regard to 
the state as long as the latter is in the process of 
achieving its Socialist program. The existence of such 
associations was considered a necessity dictated by the 
interests of groups and classes. The Convention affirmed 
the right of the working class to have political parties. 
13. The Convention paid particular attention to ideo-
logical education in the Armed Forces and affirmed the 
right of its members to practice their full political 
rights. The Convention considered the organic incorpo-
ration of the revolutionary civilian and military vanguard 
as the only way to create an ideological interaction 
between the two groups. This would mean a practical unity 
of action and thought and would incorporate the popular and 
armed forces in a combined Socialist effort. Ideological 
education for the armed forces would create a new and 
revolutionary understanding between the officers and the 
men. 
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The Convention affirmed the necessity of compulsory 
military service in an underdeveloped country where such 
service could become a school for peasant soldiers, thus 
sharing in the eradication of illiteracy in the rural 
areas. 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE ARAB STRUGGLE 
14. Following Cairo's withdrawal from the Tripartite 
Unity Agreement, the party finds itself compelled to 
establish unity between Syria and Iraq. Thus the 
Convention agreed on the principle of establishing a 
federal union between the Syrian and Iraqi Regions. The 
Convention regarded the new union as a step toward complete 
Arab unity and as capable of fusing the revolutionary 
energies in the two Regions. The new state was considered 
as a stage in the struggle for complete unity, and open for 
others to join. 
The Convention affirmed that the biggest unionist 
stride is that which brings Egypt to the new nation on the 
basis of democracy, regional equality, and collective 
leadership. 
15. The Convention considered the reactionary 
aggression by the Maghrib on the Algerian revolution. The 
essence of the problem was not a mere border dispute; 
rather, the Convention considered the aggression only as 
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another aspect of the struggle between progressivism and 
reaction in the African part of the Arab fatherland. The 
Convention insisted that the support of the Algerian 
revolution, with all its national, Socialist, revolutionary, 
and Arab characteristics, is a guarantee of the success of 
the unionist Socialist revolution in the entire Arab 
fatherland. 
Therefore, the party stands unhesitatingly with the 
Algerian revolution against the Maghrib reactionary 
aggression supported by the new and old colonialism. It 
calls on the governments of Syria and Iraq to offer the 
Algerian revolution any assistance it may require. 
16. The first aspect of the resistance of Arab reaction 
is portrayed in its aggression on the Algerian revolution. 
The second aspect is its conspicuous and frank subser-
vience to colonialism - a subservience that compels it to 
betray the Arab national cause daily. Thus the repressive 
measures utilized by the reactionary Maghrib authorities 
against Al-Ittihadal-Watani Li al-Quwah al-Sha'biyyah [The 
National Union of Popular Forces] are an aspect of subser-
vience to imperialism and a defense of the imperialist 
spheres of influence in the Maghrib. The Convention 
decided to condemn the repressive measures taken against 
Al-Ittihad al-Watani Li al-Quwah al-Sha'biyyah and declare 
its support of the latter against the forces of reaction 
and imperialism. 
XXXI 
17.. The Convention carefully considered the problem of 
diversion or pumping of the waters of the River Jordan and 
considered such a scheme a supreme military danger to the 
Arab fatherland. Thus the party calls on all the Arab 
peoples and their governments to resist this danger by 
force. The governments of Syria and Iraq in particular 
must resist this danger. It also calls on the United Arab 
government to resist this scheme even by the use of force 
and to cooperate in this endeavor with Syria and Iraq. 
18. The Convention considered the Yemenite revolution 
and saw in it another aspect of the struggle between the 
Arab reactionary forces and the Arab peoples. The Conven-
tion saw in the Yemenite revolution a revolutionary take-
-off point to save the Arab south and the Arabian peninsula 
from the reactionaries and imperialist stooges. The 
Convention calls on all the progressive Arab forces to 
rally around the Yemenite revolution and support it against 
the reactionaries. In particular, the Convention calls on 
the revolutionary authorities in Syria and Iraq to aid and 
support the Yemenite revolution. Such support should be 
viewed as a duty imposed by Arab destiny and an element in 
the defeat of reaction. 
19. The Convent ion discussed the positive and negative 
aspects of Abdel Nasser's regime and reiterated the 
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importance of the presence of the United Arab Republic, 
quantitatively and qualitatively, in any union. 
The positive aspects of Abdel Nasser's regime 
prompt the party to accept a union with it. The negative 
aspects, however, compel the party to accept Abdel Nasser's 
regime only as a partner but not as the basis of the union. 
The party considers this a condition that permits the 
process of correction and interaction of the revolutionary 
Arab movements. The Convention affirmed that Abdel 
Nasser's autocratic regime had imposed on the party an 
unnecessary struggle with it. 
The Convention agreed on the necessity of 
haltingthis struggle and finding mutual points of under-
standing among the libertarian Arab movements. 
20. The Convention studied carefully the development of 
the contemporary Arab problem in Palestine and concluded 
the necessity of recruiting the Palestinian Arabs as the 
first tool in the liberation of palestine. 
The Convention recommends the establishment of a 
Palestine Liberation Front and calls on all Arab govern-
ments, and on Syria and Iraq in particular, to offer all 
available resources to the establishment of this Front. 
All the necessary tools and revolutionary leadership should 
be provided. The Front must be kept out of disputes among 
Arab states. 
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21. From its deep faith in the unity of the entire Arab 
World, the Convention stresses the necessity of establish-
ing a Progressive Arab Front to include the entire Arab 
fatherland. 
22. The Convention reaffirmed the basic revolutionary 
policy that has been pursued by the party since its est-
ablishment and that endeavors to support all national 
liberation movements against imperialism. The Convention 
exposed the recent methods of cooperation between the 
bourgeoitie and neoimperialism in defining the party's 
stand vis-a-vis imperialism by explaining its role as a 
Socialist party belonging to a persecuted and colonized 
people. Therefore, the Convention cautioned against the 
belief that the construction of a Socialist society that 
places the people's Interest first cannot be completed 
without entailing a struggle against imperialism, and 
against every aspect of the exploitation of man. 
23. The Convention affirmed the policy of nonalignment 
with international power blocs, and neutrality in the daily 
disputes of the blocs. 
24. But nonalignment should not be construed as a bar 
against closer and friendlier relations with the peoples 
of the Socialist camp. 
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25. The Convention afftrm«d the neceBsity of 
strengthening the ties with the nations of the Third World, 
to which we belong and which pursues the policy of 
positive neutrality. Closer ties will mean strengthening 
the Front against imperialism. 
26. The Convention decided to fight all types of racial 
discrimination in the world and to consider such a 
phenomenon as another characteristic of colonial 
capitalism. The Convention views South Africa as a new 
kind of Israel in Africa. The party stands against racial 
discrimination in this nation and extends its helping hand 
to all peoples struggling against the new and old 
imperialism. 
